arXiv Machine Learning By Greg Gluch, Shafi Goldwasser, Anastasiia Struss

Does More Compute Make Every Adversarial Attack Transferable?

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The paper investigates whether increased computational resources for an attacker can make adversarial attacks transferable across all defenders. It finds that for classification tasks, a quadratic resource gap guarantees either a transferable attack or a defense, whereas for generative tasks this guarantee fails. The authors also show that a defense that adds computation after seeing the input can be provably stronger than any fixed-model defense, suggesting that inference-time compute can enhance robustness.

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