arXiv:2606. 08590v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Kubernetes incidents are diagnosed reliably only when a root-cause system's reported gains come from incident evidence rather than scenario-specific shortcuts.
By Anastasiia Kuvshinova, Seungmin Jin
arXiv:2607. 28545v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can write, patch, and search code, but oncall root cause analysis (RCA) demands something different: reasoning over noisy metrics, logs, traces, and source code, starting from ambiguous user-facing reports, often hours after the incident began.
By Albert Gong, Kyuseong Choi, Abhineet Agarwal, Jason Schechner, Ryan Huang, Raj Agrawal, Anish Agarwal, Raaz Dwivedi
arXiv:2609.36686v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Identifying the root cause of an anomaly among hundreds of sensors is critical for preventing safety incidents and costly downtime in complex monitored...
By Hada Melino Muhammad, Luan Pham, Laure Barri\`ere, Sachin Shetty, Leonardo Pulga, Flora D. Salim
arXiv:2607. 27290v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern telecommunication, cloud, and microservice systems emit correlated alarm cascades when components fail.
By Lei Zan, Keli Zhang, Shifeng Xie, Jiale Zheng, Zehao Xiao, Zhiwei Dong, Ke Zhang, Ruichu Cai, Malik Tiomoko, Lujia Pan
The paper investigates the reliability of language‑model judges used as measurement instruments on shared endpoints. Through two preregistered audits of 52,988 requests, the authors found that repeat rankings and byte‑identical replays fell far short of required thresholds, revealing significant instability. They identify three mechanisms—label‑to‑meaning bias, candidate gaps below the noise floor, and input permutation noise—that explain the gap, and propose a snapshot‑identity ladder, design rules, and a reporting checklist to mitigate such failures.
The paper investigates how causal action verifiers, which guard language agents’ tool calls by checking identifiability against a committed action‑state graph, can be compromised through small graph misspecifications. By removing a single bidirected edge or reversing an arrowhead, the authors demonstrate that a verifier (CIVeX) that originally had zero false executions can suffer false execution rates up to 48.9%, with most of those executions being harmful and overall utility dropping dramatically. An additional attestation step that samples executions can detect these attacks with few false alarms, but it also leads to many wrongful rejections that reduce beneficial actions and incur significant experimental costs.
whyItMatters":"The study shows that even minor errors in the verifier’s underlying graph can drastically undermine safety and performance, highlighting the need for robust auditing mechanisms."
By Fabio Rovai