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arXiv AI By Zhaoyuan Huang, Tianjie Ju, Pengzhou Cheng, Zheng Wu, Yansi Li, Chuanbiao Song, Jun Lan, Huijia Zhu, Weiqiang Wang, Zhuosheng Zhang

Do GUI Agents Know When Not to Act? Enabling Conflict-Aware Termination for Multimodal GUI Agents

Read the original on arXiv AI →

The paper introduces CONFLICTGUI, a benchmark that tests GUI agents on instruction-internal and instruction‑GUI context conflicts, revealing that many agents over‑comply with infeasible instructions. To address this, the authors propose CONFLICTGUARD, an inference‑time framework that couples a feasibility verification protocol with a conditional action modulation mechanism, enabling agents to assess instruction logic and GUI evidence before acting. Experiments on five agents show that CONFLICTGUARD significantly improves conflict‑task success while maintaining normal task performance.

Machine-generated by The Flow from the publisher's headline and feed description — not written or checked by a human. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

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