Constitutional adapters: Inference-time interventions for misalignment and misuse
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
arXiv:2603. 19423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks.
arXiv:2606. 05817v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Consistency training encourages models to behave similarly across different contexts, and has shown promise for reducing misalignment.
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.
The paper proposes probe-guided fine-tuning, a method that uses probes detecting undesired properties in model activations as a direct training signal. Experiments show that continuously updated probes reduce harmfulness and improve honesty while preserving utility, outperforming DPO and inference-time steering in safety-utility trade-offs and robustness to jailbreak and abliteration attacks. Importantly, the concepts remain linearly encoded after fine-tuning, maintaining monitorability.
arXiv:2508. 06249v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Fine-tuning lets practitioners repurpose aligned large language models (LLMs) for new domains, yet recent work reveals emergent misalignment (EM): Even a small, domain-specific fine-tune can induce harmful behaviors far outside the target domain.