arXiv:2606. 17462v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks achieve high accuracy in controlled laboratory settings, they often degrade substantially in real-world environments due to spatio-temporal drift, browser heterogeneity, proxy obfuscation and etc.
By Chongru Fan, Wei Wang, Wentao Huang, Zhenquan Ding, Jinqiao Shi, Lei Cui, Zhiyu Hao, Xiaochun Yun
FlowAtom is a new method for multi‑label website fingerprinting that aggregates evidence from encrypted traffic flows into shared prototypes called Atoms. It pre‑trains a flow encoder on unlabeled traffic, then combines Atom responses across flows within each observation window to produce a fixed‑dimensional, permutation‑invariant representation for predicting which monitored websites were visited. In closed‑world tests on Direct HTTPS, Trojan, and VMess traffic, FlowAtom achieves micro‑F1 scores of 97.82%, 94.43%, and 93.92% respectively, and consistently outperforms baseline approaches in open‑world scenarios involving monitored visits.
By Chongru Fan, Wentao Huang, Wei Wang, Zhenquan Ding, Jinqiao Shi, Wei Cai, Zhiyu Hao
arXiv:2606. 04517v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Graph-based deep learning methods have been widely employed in encrypted traffic analysis to exploit latent correlations across different granularities.
By Yuantu Luo, Jun Tao, Linxiao Yu, Guang Cheng
arXiv:2606. 00514v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generative modeling and self-supervised representation learning (SSL) optimize structurally different objectives: generative training rewards distributional fidelity, while SSL rewards semantic coherence.
By Hugues Van Assel, Edward De Brouwer, Saeed Saremi, Gabriele Scalia, Aviv Regev
arXiv:2608. 09867v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage.
By Alexander Panfilov, David Schmotz, Ilia Shumailov, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Joachim Schaeffer, Ameya Prabhu, Jonas Geiping, Maksym Andriushchenko
arXiv:2504. 01882v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The use of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) tunneling by an attacker to hide malicious activity within encrypted DNS traffic poses a serious threat to network security, as it allows malicious actors to bypass traditional monitoring and intrusion detection systems while evading detection by conventional traffic analysis techniques.
By Diego Cajaraville-Aboy, Marta Moure-Garrido, Carlos Beis-Penedo, Carlos Garcia-Rubio, Rebeca P. D\'iaz-Redondo, Celeste Campo, Ana Fern\'andez-Vilas, Manuel Fern\'andez-Veiga