arXiv AI By Alfredo Metere

Attested Tool-Server Admission: A Security Extension to the Model Context Protocol

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arXiv:2605. 24248v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how a large-language-model (LLM) agent and an external tool server exchange messages, but not trust: a host reads a server's self-declared tool list and dispatches calls, with no notion of which servers it may use, at what sensitivity, or which of a server's tools are in bounds.

Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.

arXiv AI
2d ago

Mandato: Protocol-Level Enforcement of Digitally Signed Mandates on AI Agent Actions with Cryptographically Chained Audit Trails

arXiv:2608. 14074v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act on external systems through standardized tool-calling protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), yet no infrastructure layer constrains their actions to what a principal has verifiably authorized: authorization logic lives in application code, is neither signed nor independently auditable, and the resulting logs lack evidentiary value.

By Giovanni Racioppi