Artificiality's First Exam: An LLM-Referenced C-test for Supraintelligence
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2610.32104v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Several formal theories have been developed to characterize the capabilities and limitations of the transformer architecture, each employing differen...
The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) balance capability and efficiency when using Chain-of-Thought reasoning on arithmetic and algorithmic tasks. It finds that while larger models solve more problems correctly, the improvement follows an exponential decay that slows with scale, indicating diminishing returns. Additionally, the length of reasoning output grows with problem size but does not improve with larger models, suggesting efficiency does not benefit from scaling.
The paper investigates integer‑sequence benchmarks from the OEIS by applying a two‑part minimum description length (MDL) learner that searches for P‑recursive recurrences. It finds that MDL difficulty correlates with a combinatorial parameter count, that most sequences fit a recurrence on a prefix but not at full length (the “wilderness” regime), and that language models do not hallucinate in the wilderness but instead hedge, showing that memorisation dominates perceived competence. The study provides a cheap, contamination‑free difficulty signal for OEIS‑derived benchmarks.
arXiv:2605.10851v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We initiate the study of the Generalized Turing Test (GTT), a formal generalization of Turing's imitation game from humans to arbitrary interactive...
arXiv:2601. 05280v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: On the one hand, the question of whether large language models (LLMs) are Solomonoff induction estimators has become an explicit question at the intersection of Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT) and Machine Learning (ML) of great interest.
The paper argues that Large Language Models (LLMs) do not function as Solomonoff induction estimators because their training objectives—cross‑entropy, negative log‑likelihood, and next‑token prediction—optimize fit to a supplied conditional distribution rather than a program‑weighted universal mixture. It further contends that additional computation alone does not transform these models into optimal predictors without external hyper‑parameter or architectural changes. The authors suggest that neurosymbolic machine learning, exemplified by models such as Fable and Astra, represents a shift toward symbolic model synthesis, moving beyond purely statistical LLMs.