arXiv:2603. 19127v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As Spoken Language Models (SLMs) integrate speech and text modalities, they inherit the safety vulnerabilities of their LLM backbone while introducing an expanded attack surface.
By Aravind Krishnan, Karolina Sta\'nczak, Dietrich Klakow
arXiv:2602. 12418v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks remain a persistent threat to large language model safety.
By Yannick Assogba, Jacopo Cortellazzi, Javier Abad, Pau Rodriguez, Xavier Suau, Arno Blaas
arXiv:2508. 10031v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in performance, various jailbreak attacks have posed growing safety and ethical risks.
By Jinhwa Kim, Ian G. Harris
arXiv:2607. 19424v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates.
By Qingjia Huang, Jingyu Zhang, Jianguo Wu, Yakai Li, Weijuan Zhang, Yankai Rong, Junyi Yao, Shengzhi Zhang, Xiaoqi Jia
arXiv:2502. 09755v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned LLMs respond to prompts with either compliance or refusal, each corresponding to distinct directions in the model's activation space.
By Amit Levi, Rom Himelstein, Yaniv Nemcovsky, Avi Mendelson, Chaim Baskin
arXiv:2606. 16242v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Rapid Response (RR) framework, deployed in production systems, including Anthropic's ASL-3 safeguards, continuously improves jailbreak-detection classifiers.
By David Huang, Jaewon Chang, Avidan Shah, Prateek Mittal, Chawin Sitawarin
arXiv:2602. 24009v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak techniques for large language models (LLMs) evolve faster than benchmarks, making robustness estimates stale and difficult to compare across papers due to drift in datasets, harnesses, and judging protocols.
By Zhicheng Fang, Jingjie Zheng, Chenxu Fu, Wei Xu
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
By Wenpeng Xing, Bohan Yang, Mohan Li, Chunqiang Hu, Haitao Xu, Ningyu Zhang, Bo Lin, Meng Han
arXiv:2606. 11425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose persistent safety weaknesses in large language models (LLMs), but existing stateless single-turn methods face a trade-off: hand-crafted prompts are expressive but static, while iterative prompt optimization can adapt but often relies on low-level mutations that require many target queries.
By Ge Shi, Jun Yin, Donglin Xie, Fangyi Liu, Yucan Li, Menglin Liu
arXiv:2608. 03070v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier AI model developers increasingly rely on layered safeguards to prevent catastrophic misuse, but little public evidence exists on how much protection these safeguards provide, or how consistently across developers.
By Jasper Timm, Lukas Struppek, Ziwei Xu, Grace Cheong, Oscar Mata, Dan Zhao, Mick Yang, Isadora De Andrade, Xiaojun Jia, Yiming Li, Samuel Bauer, Heather McIntyre, Adam Gleave, Edward Yee, Kellin Pelrine
Large Language Models (LLMs) in real-world applications often face the risks of specially crafted prompts designed to bypass the safety controls. Existing guardrail methods, such as LLM-as-a-judge and cloud-based safety APIs are able to detect unsafe content.
arXiv:2602. 02557v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent advances in end-to-end trained omni-models have substantially improved audio capabilities by strengthening text-audio modality alignment.
By Yupeng Chen, Junchi Yu, Aoxi Liu, Baoyuan Wu, Philip Torr, Adel Bibi