Refusal Beyond a Single Direction: A Preliminary Comparison of Diff-in-Means and INLP
arXiv:2606. 13720v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Arditi et al.
arXiv:2605. 26772v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought (CoT) traces before producing final outputs, introducing a dynamic internal state that may complicate control mechanisms such as refusal.
arXiv:2606. 13720v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Arditi et al.
arXiv:2607. 29062v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model capabilities have improved in large part due to scaling chain of thought.
arXiv:2606. 26161v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Linear directions in activation space have been identified for both refusal and persona traits in instruction-tuned chat models, but the two have been studied as separate mechanisms.
arXiv:2603. 01437v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning.
arXiv:2607. 14147v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Aligned language models refuse harmful requests, but a one-line prefill ("Sure, here is") strips the refusal.
arXiv:2608. 15772v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When a language model refuses to answer a prompt, it is unclear whether the correct answer is erased from its internal representations, or merely suppressed at the output layer.
arXiv:2606. 26935v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is widely used in language-model agents, but prior work has shown that verbalized CoT is not always faithful and may instead reflect post-hoc reasoning, which means the model already knows the answer before reasoning.
arXiv:2602. 06941v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models can recover mid-generation from task-misaligned activation steering, producing explicit verbal restarts (e.
arXiv:2605. 21706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations.
arXiv:2606. 26502v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) take longer on harder problems, just as humans do.
arXiv:2608. 06578v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier language models are trained using distinct data, objectives, and safety pipelines.
arXiv:2602. 20710v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Inspecting Chain-of-Thought reasoning is among the most common means of understanding why an LLM produced its output.