arXiv:2606. 02641v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Interactive driving exposes a failure mode that is easy to miss in rule-aware autonomous-driving stacks: a hard-rule margin can be negative for an ego candidate even though a small lawful accommodation by a non-priority agent would restore feasibility.
arXiv:2606. 06531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The critical question after a correct driving veto is not only whether a maneuver is unsafe, but whether the blocked interaction admits a lawful, auditable, and responsibility-bounded repair.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2606. 07437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2607. 23532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments.
arXiv:2607. 00334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agents, whether LLM-driven software agents or robotic physical agents, face a common class of failure modes when operating without continuous human oversight: safety violations from unverified actions, behavioral instability from unconstrained loops, and continuity loss from unhandled error states.
arXiv:2606. 06460v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly hold real credentials and operate infrastructure with no human in the loop, yet operators have no standard way to tell an agent a resource is off-limits, or to ask a running agent to stand down: access controls either admit it or hard-fail it.
arXiv:2606. 14130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents.
arXiv:2608. 16710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As autonomous vehicles (AVs) approach Level 4 and Level 5 operational capability [SAE International, 2018], their on- board decision systems must handle not only safety-critical locomotion but also their subsequent moral weight.
arXiv:2606. 19111v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Team science holds that leadership is contingent: it helps only under specific conditions, and capable, autonomous teams may need none at all.
arXiv:2606. 16326v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget.
arXiv:2606. 19356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When multi-agent LLM systems produce bad answers, not all failures are equal: some answers are grounded in the right material but incomplete, while others are simply ungrounded and should be stopped.