arXiv:2606. 02641v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Interactive driving exposes a failure mode that is easy to miss in rule-aware autonomous-driving stacks: a hard-rule margin can be negative for an ego candidate even though a small lawful accommodation by a non-priority agent would restore feasibility.
arXiv:2606. 06531v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The critical question after a correct driving veto is not only whether a maneuver is unsafe, but whether the blocked interaction admits a lawful, auditable, and responsibility-bounded repair.
The paper investigates how multiple pre‑action controls—authority, resource, and evidence gates—interact in agentic AI systems. It formalizes remediation‑induced control coupling, showing that remediation can invalidate earlier judgments and that the order of remediation matters. The authors propose a remediate‑and‑regate protocol to restore soundness, analyze non‑commuting remediation operators, and demonstrate the approach on a deterministic open‑data artifact with three published engines.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2606. 07437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2607. 23532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments.
arXiv:2607. 00334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agents, whether LLM-driven software agents or robotic physical agents, face a common class of failure modes when operating without continuous human oversight: safety violations from unverified actions, behavioral instability from unconstrained loops, and continuity loss from unhandled error states.
arXiv:2606. 06460v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly hold real credentials and operate infrastructure with no human in the loop, yet operators have no standard way to tell an agent a resource is off-limits, or to ask a running agent to stand down: access controls either admit it or hard-fail it.
arXiv:2606. 14130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents.
arXiv:2608. 16710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As autonomous vehicles (AVs) approach Level 4 and Level 5 operational capability [SAE International, 2018], their on- board decision systems must handle not only safety-critical locomotion but also their subsequent moral weight.
arXiv:2606. 19111v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Team science holds that leadership is contingent: it helps only under specific conditions, and capable, autonomous teams may need none at all.
arXiv:2606. 16326v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget.