arXiv AI

LLMON: An LLM-native Markup Language to Leverage Structure and Semantics at the LLM Interface

The paper introduces LLMON, an LLM-native markup language designed to encode the structure and semantic metadata of textual inputs for large language models. By distinguishing components such as instructions and data within prompts, LLMON aims to reduce model confusion and mitigate security risks like prompt injection. The authors outline design requirements, present the language, and provide preliminary evidence that incorporating LLMON can improve model accuracy, safety, and security during training and inference.

arXiv AI
Aug 26

Semantic Overlays: Mitigating Prompt Injection with Annotations Beyond Tokens and Steering Vectors

The paper introduces Semantic Overlays, a steering technique that adds non‑textual annotations to a language model’s input by applying learned adapters at specific prefill positions. These overlays create an out‑of‑band channel that encodes span identity and complex semantics, enabling the model to interpret marked text differently—such as rewriting code in a specified language or ignoring executable instructions. Experiments show that Semantic Overlays dramatically reduce prompt‑injection success rates while preserving model utility and readability of marked spans.

By Joshua Penman
arXiv AI
Jul 7

SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses

arXiv:2510. 15476v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as interfaces to information, code, and real-world services, making prompt-level security failures a practical concern.

By Hanbin Hong, Shuang Wu, Shuya Feng, Nima Naderloui, Shenao Yan, Jingyu Zhang, Ali Arastehfard, Heqing Huang, Yuan Hong
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 27

A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots

The paper introduces a three‑layer security framework designed to protect retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) chatbots from both direct and indirect prompt injection attacks. Layer 1 filters user input with rule‑based patterns and a semantic anomaly classifier; Layer 2 enforces a provenance‑based instruction hierarchy during context assembly; Layer 3 audits model output with a policy rule engine and semantic drift detector. Evaluations on GPT‑4o, Llama 3, and Mistral 7B demonstrate a reduction in attack success rate from 71.4 % to 11.3 %, outperforming existing single‑layer defenses while keeping false positives low and latency acceptable.

By Gulshan Saleem, Nisar Ahmed, Muhammad Imran Zaman, Ali Hassan, Umar Mujahid
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Predicting Program Exit Code with LLMs and Programming Language Semantics

The paper introduces Program Executability Prediction (PrEx), a task that asks large language models (LLMs) to determine whether a program is semantically valid or invalid and, if invalid, to identify the violated formal rule. To evaluate this, the authors create a dataset of systematically generated invalid programs derived from valid ones and test open‑source coding LLMs across different semantic formalisms, semantic shifts, and program splits (human‑written, LLM‑translated, fuzzer‑generated). Results show that LLMs rely more on pre‑training priors than on the provided semantics, performing poorly on modified semantics and with increasing program complexity.

By Lara Marinov, Aditya Thimmaiah, Jayanth Srinivasa, Junyi Jessy Li, Milos Gligoric