arXiv:2606. 16364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents mis-call tools, and the natural guess is that the model failed to see the right tool in a crowded harness.
arXiv:2607. 18553v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can a language model read the quality of ongoing computation, and can an external intervention turn that readout into better outcomes?
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why. We introduce canary tools: diagnostic probe tools planted in an agent's Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool set, each engineered to probe one specific tool-selection weakness.
arXiv:2605. 24660v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Before an LLM agent can use a tool, a retrieval system must decide which candidate tools to show to the agent.
arXiv:2607. 17136v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic computer-use RL is reported in single runs, and those numbers mislead.
arXiv:2608. 02464v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents fail mid-episode -- they loop, cascade tool errors, drift off goal, fabricate results, or silently absorb corrupted content -- and the standard remedy, judging every step with a second LLM, costs more than the agent itself.
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
arXiv:2608. 15022v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language models hold latent quantities in a form they can report on, and more of a quantity is present in that form when the task requires reusing it flexibly.
arXiv:2606. 05378v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We test whether a single screen-and-ablate recipe -- identify attention-head circuits by task-pattern selectivity, then verify by causal ablation against a matched-random null -- produces consistent mechanistic claims across model families.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2608. 03327v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Hybrid computer-use agents can act through screenshots or call text tools.
arXiv:2607. 11022v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The test suites used as RLVR rewards for code have natural false positives: per-task, persistent, asymmetric errors that accept the same wrong programs every time they appear, unlike the symmetric or resampled noise assumed by existing noise-robustness analyses.