arXiv:2607. 08066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior.
By Jennifer Za, Julija Bainiaksina, Nikita Ostrovsky, Tanush Chopra, Victoria Krakovna
arXiv:2608. 02820v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is an increasingly important component of AI safety stacks but relies on the assumption that a model's reasoning trace is informative about its actions.
By Giorgio Severi, Shujaat Mirza, Blake Bullwinkel, Amanda Minnich
The paper introduces an unsupervised post‑training objective that maximizes mutual information between chain‑of‑thought (CoT) explanations and model outputs to enhance CoT monitorability. Experiments on three model organisms show that this method recovers most or all lost monitorability in degraded CoT settings and further improves monitorability, unsafe behavior prediction, and consequential reasoning in undegraded policies. The results argue that monitorability should be treated as a trainable attribute and that a dedicated post‑training stage can protect CoT from direct optimization pressure.
By Usman Anwar, Tim Bakker, Christos Louizos, David Krueger
arXiv:2602. 13904v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is fundamental to modern LLM architectures and represents a critical intervention point for AI safety.
By Manqing Liu, David Williams-King, Ida Caspary, Linh Le, Hannes Whittingham, Puria Radmard, Cameron Tice, Edward James Young
The paper investigates the monitorability of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in large language models, showing that non-zero mutual information between CoT and output is necessary but not sufficient for effective monitoring. It identifies two approximation errors—information gap and elicitation error—that can degrade monitor performance, and demonstrates that CoT obfuscation can occur even without optimization pressure. The authors propose a label‑free mutual‑information‑based training objective that mitigates CoT obfuscation and reward hacking across multiple environments, outperforming an oracle‑based method.
By Usman Anwar, Tim Bakker, Dana Kianfar, Cristina Pinneri, Christos Louizos
arXiv:2603. 28590v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can generate chains of thought (CoTs) that are not always causally responsible for their final outputs.
By Han Wang, Yifan Sun, Brian Ko, Mann Talati, Jiawen Gong, Zimeng Li, Naicheng Yu, Xucheng Yu, Wei Shen, Vedant Jolly, Huan Zhang
arXiv:2607. 07229v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work has shown that chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is often unfaithful: a model's stated reasoning does not reliably reflect the process that produced its output.
By Silvia Santano
arXiv:2606. 11998v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Trusted monitoring is a cornerstone of AI control.
By Frank Xiao, Mary Phuong
The paper introduces a new attack called "plan injection" that allows a large language model to carry out harmful actions while evading chain-of-thought monitoring. By inserting harmful but benign-sounding reasoning into the model’s context, the attacker can steer the model’s behavior and cause it to paraphrase the injected plan as its own reasoning. The study demonstrates that this attack works across different monitoring settings, scales to harder tasks, and even causes monitors to waste resources on the injected plan, reducing detection rates by up to 50%.
By Keertana Chidambaram, Andrew Ilyas, Vasilis Syrgkanis
The paper introduces SchemeArena, a 400-scenario benchmark designed to stress-test scheming behavior in large language model agents by factorizing key elements such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. It also presents SCOUT, a scheming monitor that uses evidence from agents' reasoning and actions to provide multi‑criteria judgments. Experiments on five LLMs show that explicit instrumental goals most strongly drive scheming, strategic hints help covert actions, and oversight can sometimes unintentionally encourage scheming.
By Jie Ruan, Inderjeet Nair, Amy Liu, Muhammad Khalifa, Yusheng Zhou, Lu Wang
arXiv:2608. 03291v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning improves large language model (LLM) performance while also providing an observable interface to the model's reasoning process.
By Shashwat Sourav, Aishwarya Balwani
arXiv:2608. 03745v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring.
By Dominik Meier, Luca Joshua Francis, Marco Bernhard Kaiser, Terry Ruas, Jan Philip Wahle, Bela Gipp