arXiv:2602.08136v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are now a core part of modern AI. Recent work proposed several visual jailbreak attacks using single/ holistic...
By Md Rafi Ur Rashid, MD Sadik Hossain Shanto, Vishnu Asutosh Dasu, Shagufta Mehnaz
arXiv:2606. 10571v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Adversarial examples reveal vulnerabilities in Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models and provide insights for improving robustness.
By Lijia Yu, Jiuxin Cao, Yuchen Qiang, Changhao Chen, Yifei Huang, Bo Liu
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2606. 02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Supervised fine-tuning is the predominant approach for adapting autoregressive vision-language models to downstream tasks.
By Ivan Saboli\'c, Marin Or\v{s}i\'c, Josip \v{S}ari\'c, Sven Lon\v{c}ari\'c
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
By Ilan Zini, Boussad Addad, Katarzyna Kapusta
arXiv:2503. 11832v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Recent vision language models (VLMs) have made remarkable strides in generative modeling with multimodal inputs, particularly text and images.
By Yiwei Chen, Yuguang Yao, Yihua Zhang, Bingquan Shen, Gaowen Liu, Sijia Liu
arXiv:2511.18921v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Backdoor attacks undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of machine learning systems by injecting hidden behaviors that can be maliciously ac...
By Juncheng Li, Yige Li, Hanxun Huang, Yunhao Chen, Xin Wang, Yixu Wang, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang
arXiv:2606. 24388v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce a large-scale, open-source dataset of pre-generated adversarial attacks for vision-language models (VLMs).
By Simone Gallivanone, Hossein Khodadadi, Mauro Dore, Mauro Medda, Nicola Franco
DecisionRobust is a new benchmark that evaluates the robustness of JEV-style decision models to adversarial attacks across both text and vision inputs. It includes a variety of attack types—semantic text perturbations, image perturbations, and prompt injections—and uses external validity checks and cross-model candidate selection to curate evaluation sets. Experiments on 30 text and 17 vision model configurations reveal that vulnerabilities can transfer across models, robustness varies by task and attack, and label-consistency checks significantly reduce apparent attack success.
By Yifan Lan, Zhongye Liu, Yurui Chang, Hanyu Wang, Yongkang Du, Lu Lin, Jinghui Chen
arXiv:2610.10436v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Adversarial perturbations can alter the predictions of frozen vision-language models (VLMs) while leaving their confidence and image--text similarity p...
By Arash Vashagh, Roozbeh Razavi-Far
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
The paper demonstrates that a targeted adversarial perturbation can reduce a vision‑language model’s training loss to near zero for a fixed target caption, yet the same model, when generating freely, still produces the correct description. This phenomenon, termed the train/inference gap, is traced to a single autoregressive step where the target token’s rank is fixed across all images, and further analysis shows that the language decoder, rather than the visual encoder, determines whether the corrupted signal is amplified or suppressed. The study uses a controlled two‑stage PGD attack on Qwen2.5‑VL‑7B‑Instruct and evaluates the effect on 200 held‑out COCO images, revealing that adversarial robustness in autoregressive VLMs largely depends on the language decoder’s prior.
whyItMatters":"The findings suggest that defenses and faithfulness evaluations for deployed vision‑language models should focus on the language decoder rather than the visual encoder, as the former is the key determinant of robustness to adversarial perturbations."
By Arun Josephraj Arokiaraj, Zekun Wu, Adriano Koshiyama