arXiv:2607. 07573v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Assigning Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories to Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) records remains an important but largely manual step in vulnerability analysis.
By Ana Schwengber Kelm, Christian Bockermann, J\"org Frochte
arXiv:2607. 11994v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Classifying cybersecurity vulnerabilities using the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) taxonomy is challenging due to extreme class imbalance and strong hierarchical dependencies among weakness categories.
By Bipin Chhetri, Deepika Giri, Avishek Kadel, Rabin Kumar Karki, Akbar Siami Namin
arXiv:2606. 00647v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Detecting psychological defense mechanisms in conversational text remains a challenging clinical NLP problem.
By Shefayat E Shams Adib, Ahmed Alfey Sani, Md Hasibur Rahman Alif, Ajwad Abrar
arXiv:2512. 10485v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vulnerability detection methods based on deep learning (DL) have shown strong performance on benchmark datasets, yet their real-world effectiveness remains underexplored.
By Chaomeng Lu, Bert Lagaisse
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
By Arastoo Zibaeirad, Marco Vieira
arXiv:2606. 27091v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs fine-tuned for security classification are usually evaluated on held-out examples from the same distribution as their training data.
By Ryan Fetterman
arXiv:2607. 21069v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The original ALPHA benchmark introduced a taxonomy-aware penalty for evaluating CWE-level vulnerability prediction in Python and proposed that the penalty could theoretically also serve as a training signal.
By Muntasir Adnan, Manile Srun, Carlos C. N. Kuhn
arXiv:2608. 15412v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Encoder-based code representation models remain widely deployed for discriminative tasks such as clone detection and code classification, where their small size and low inference cost are decisive.
By Yifeng He, Yundi Xu, Christopher Castro Gaw Gonzalo, Zili Wang, Hao Chen
arXiv:2604. 12069v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Robust explanations are increasingly required for user trust in enterprise NLP, yet pre-deployment validation is difficult in the common case of black-box deployment (API-only access) where representation-based explainers are infeasible and existing studies provide limited guidance on whether explanations remain stable under real user noise, especially when organizations migrate from encoder classifiers to decoder LLMs.
By Guilin Zhang, Kai Zhao, Jeffrey Friedman, Xu Chu, Amine Anoun, Jerry Ting
arXiv:2602. 14161v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization.
By Max Fomin
arXiv:2604. 23130v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent failure mode in safety-aligned LLMs: models can be pushed into harmful behavior, but the internal representations enabling this shift remain poorly localized.
By Nilanjana Das, Mathew Dawit, Aman Chadha, Manas Gaur
arXiv:2608. 03854v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When decoder language models are used as classifiers, predicted class probabilities depend on implementation choices, including the prompt template, verbalizer (label-to-token mapping), and scoring rule, that are rarely treated as experimental variables.
By Anton Rasmussen, Hong Qin