arXiv AI

What Do AI Agents Actually Change? An Empirical Taxonomy of Mutation Patterns in Performance-Improving Pull Requests

arXiv:2607. 05666v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents are black boxes: we cannot inspect how they generate code, but we can inspect what they change.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 10

TTHE: Test-Time Harness Evolution

arXiv:2607. 08124v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The behavior of an LLM agent is determined not only by the underlying model, but also by its harness: the executable program that constructs context, invokes tools, verifies intermediate results, and recovers from failures.

By Jun Nie, Yonggang Zhang, Jun Song, Qianshu Cai, Dahai Yu, Yike Guo, Xinmei Tian, Bo Han
arXiv AI
1d ago

Evolving Ensemble of Agents

arXiv:2605. 09018v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce the Evolving Ensemble of Agents (EvE), a decentralized framework that organizes existing, highly capable coding agents into a live, co-evolving system for algorithmic discovery.

By Zongmin Yu, Liu Yang
arXiv AI
Jul 22

Don't Blame the Large Language Model: How Agent Harness Evolution Shapes Coding Agent Quality

arXiv:2607. 03691v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Coding agents, autonomous systems that use large language models (LLMs) to resolve software engineering tasks, rely on agent harness: a middleware layer in between a developer and a large language model that orchestrates system prompts, tool execution, context management, and iterative reasoning loops.

By Oussama Ben Sghaier, Hao Li, Bram Adams, Ahmed E. Hassan
arXiv AI
Jul 7

Evolutionary Ensemble of Agents

arXiv:2605. 09018v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce Evolutionary Ensemble (EvE), a decentralized framework that organizes existing, highly capable coding agents into a live, co-evolving system for algorithmic discovery.

By Zongmin Yu, Liu Yang
arXiv AI
Jun 2

AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations

arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.

By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney