arXiv:2607. 11607v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Distributional reinforcement learning agents learn full return distributions that are increasingly read at face value: for interpretability, risk-sensitive control, and safety monitoring.
arXiv:2607. 29400v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A routing decision can be revised at the next transaction, but a latched source exclusion persists across later decisions.
arXiv:2606. 29713v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hallucination is the reliability bottleneck for LLM-based agents, and fact attribution verifiers are the last line of defense -- yet today's verifiers emit only opaque binary labels, leaving agents unable to self-correct and operators unable to audit.
arXiv:2510. 06096v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The objectives that Large Language Models (LLMs) implicitly optimize remain dangerously opaque, making trustworthy alignment and auditing a grand challenge.
arXiv:2607. 11022v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The test suites used as RLVR rewards for code have natural false positives: per-task, persistent, asymmetric errors that accept the same wrong programs every time they appear, unlike the symmetric or resampled noise assumed by existing noise-robustness analyses.
arXiv:2608. 07914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power.
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
arXiv:2607. 20379v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Natural-language autoencoders score explanations of hidden activations by reconstruction: an explanation is deemed faithful if the activation can be regenerated from it.
arXiv:2606. 08275v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When an LLM agent fails -- issues a refund it should not have, calls the wrong tool, leaks data -- existing tooling answers what happened (observability) or whether it passed (evaluation), but not which step caused the failure.
arXiv:2607. 10814v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did.
arXiv:2607. 19453v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We audit whether candle-based machine-learning models can turn predictions of cryptocurrency extrema or short-horizon outcomes into positive Binance Spot paper policies after assumed costs.
arXiv:2608. 15286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce AgentRelBench, an environment-agnostic reliability instrument that computes ground-truth, severity-priced damage from database state diffs across repeated runs, with no LLM in the measurement path, demonstrated on EnterpriseOps-Gym.
arXiv:2607. 12985v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Aligned language models routinely misreport under non-evidential incentive pressure: they agree with a confident user or overstate certainty even when their internal belief is unchanged.