Shielded reinforcement learning is typically presented as a runtime safety mechanism that compiles temporal-logic specifications into automata restricting an agent's actions. We argue this is the wrong product.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2606. 14130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents.
By Omar Adalat, Edwin Hamel-De le Court, Francesco Belardinelli
arXiv:2506. 07468v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Conventional large language model (LLM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint loop: attackers exploit a static model, then defenders patch exposed vulnerabilities.
By Mickel Liu, Liwei Jiang, Yancheng Liang, Simon Shaolei Du, Yejin Choi, Tim Althoff, Natasha Jaques
arXiv:2608. 03662v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety shields are runtime enforcement mechanisms that restrict the actions of a controller to guarantee safety.
By Filip Cano, Thomas A. Henzinger, Konstantin Kueffner
arXiv:2601. 09923v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior.
By Hanna Foerster, Tom Blanchard, Kristina Nikoli\'c, Ilia Shumailov, Cheng Zhang, Robert Mullins, Nicolas Papernot, Florian Tram\`er, Yiren Zhao
arXiv:2510. 06445v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are now used throughout cybersecurity.
By Asif Shahriar, Md Nafiu Rahman, Sadif Ahmed, Farig Sadeque, Md Rizwan Parvez
arXiv:2606. 03804v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe exploration is a key challenge in Reinforcement Learning (RL) that aims to prevent agents from making harmful decisions while exploring their environment.
By Stefan Pranger, Bettina K\"onighofer
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
By Albus W. Ng, Yi Han, Jusheng Zhang, Wenhao Wang
arXiv:2607. 03423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern AI agent implementations such as frontier coding agents chain multiple tools at runtime that create a security surface that per-tool guardrails are unable to address, as individually permitted tools can violate organizational policies when composed.
By Chris Schneider, Kriti Faujdar, Philipp Schoenegger, Ben Bariach
arXiv:2607. 15003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of autonomous cyber-physical systems in safety-critical environments requires closed-loop control strategies (i.
By Riccardo Curcio, Toni Mancini, Enrico Tronci
arXiv:2607. 04613v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agents are moving from sandboxed text generators to operators of code, data, and physical infrastructure, and they increasingly learn while deployed.
By Xue Qin, Simin Luan, Cong Yang, Zhijun Li