arXiv:2606. 13621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shielded reinforcement learning is typically presented as a runtime safety mechanism that compiles temporal-logic specifications into automata restricting an agent's actions.
By Achraf Hsain, Sultan Almuhammadi
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2606. 14130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents.
By Omar Adalat, Edwin Hamel-De le Court, Francesco Belardinelli
arXiv:2506. 07468v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Conventional large language model (LLM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint loop: attackers exploit a static model, then defenders patch exposed vulnerabilities.
By Mickel Liu, Liwei Jiang, Yancheng Liang, Simon Shaolei Du, Yejin Choi, Tim Althoff, Natasha Jaques
arXiv:2608. 03662v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety shields are runtime enforcement mechanisms that restrict the actions of a controller to guarantee safety.
By Filip Cano, Thomas A. Henzinger, Konstantin Kueffner
arXiv:2601. 09923v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior.
By Hanna Foerster, Tom Blanchard, Kristina Nikoli\'c, Ilia Shumailov, Cheng Zhang, Robert Mullins, Nicolas Papernot, Florian Tram\`er, Yiren Zhao