arXiv:2606. 13621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shielded reinforcement learning is typically presented as a runtime safety mechanism that compiles temporal-logic specifications into automata restricting an agent's actions.
By Achraf Hsain, Sultan Almuhammadi
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2606.13621v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Formal safety analysis determines whether a system admits a safe defense; adaptive evaluation characterizes the operating quality sustained under a...
By Achraf Hsain, Sultan Almuhammadi
arXiv:2606. 14130v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe coordination problems surface in multi-agent reinforcement learning when global safety cannot be enforced by any agent unilaterally: the admissibility of one agent's action may depend on the dynamics of other agents.
By Omar Adalat, Edwin Hamel-De le Court, Francesco Belardinelli
arXiv:2402.03741v4 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Recent advancements in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) have opened up vast application prospects, such as swarm control of drones,...
By Oubo Ma, Yuwen Pu, Linkang Du, Yang Dai, Ruo Wang, Xiaolei Liu, Yingcai Wu, Shouling Ji
The paper proposes a split‑control architecture for adaptive security at the network edge, where an untrusted planner emits typed security intents that are vetted by a deterministic governor before being enacted. The governor checks each intent against safety, resource, temporal‑stability, and proportionality invariants, issuing signed receipts for admitted actions that are compiled into eBPF map updates. Experiments on a Raspberry Pi 5 connected to a university 5G test network show the governor can admit, reject, and bound intents at microsecond cost without disrupting protected‑flow regularity.
By Ijaz Ahmad, Ijaz Ahmad, Flavio Esposito, Erkki Harjula