arXiv:2607. 14006v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise.
By Mohammad Allahbakhsh, Mohammad Hassan Bahari, Moslem Attar-Raouf
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.
By Ruoyu Wang, Heng Zhao, Renjie Wu, Mengnan Zhao, Zhixuan Chu, Wanyu Lin, Tianhang Zheng
arXiv:2606. 13079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross.
By Jiaqi Luo, Jiarun Dai, Zhile Chen, Jia Xu, Weibing Wang, Yawen Duan, Brian Tse, Geng Hong, Xudong Pan, Yuan Zhang, Min Yang
arXiv:2605. 11047v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic language-model systems increasingly rely on mutable execution contexts, including files, memory, tools, skills, and auxiliary artifacts, creating security risks beyond explicit user prompts.
By Hongwei Yao, Yiming Liu, Yiling He, Bingrun Yang
arXiv:2601. 21233v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction.
By Xiang Zheng, Yutao Wu, Hanxun Huang, Yige Li, Xingjun Ma, Bo Li, Yu-Gang Jiang, Cong Wang
arXiv:2607. 05001v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports are predominantly unstructured, heterogeneous, and noisy, which limits their direct usability for automated analysis and reasoning.
By Mouhamed Amine Bouchiha, Gregory Blanc
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise for automated penetration testing, yet existing end-to-end black-box evaluations are highly susceptible to error cascading: failures in early reconnaissance can mask an agent's actual ability to exploit vulnerabilities. To more accurately characterize these capabilities, we propose a two-stage decoupled evaluation framework that separates exploit execution from reconnaissance.
arXiv:2607. 18366v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) serving as planners in tool-using autonomous agents introduce dynamic reliability risks in multi-turn execution.
By Shasha Yu, Fiona Carroll, Barry L. Bentley
arXiv:2606. 04455v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Current AI benchmarks evaluate agents on task execution within human-designed workflows.
By Xinyu Lu, Tianshu Wang, Pengbo Wang, zujie wen, Zhiqiang Zhang, Jun Zhou, Boxi Cao, Yaojie Lu, Hongyu Lin, Xianpei Han, Le Sun
arXiv:2607. 13705v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, the need for unified evaluation infrastructure becomes critical.
By Zichen Ding, Jiaye Ge, Shufan Jiang, Kai Chen, Mo Li, Qingqiu Li, Zehao Li, Zonglin Li, Tiaohao Liang, Shudong Liu, Zerun Ma, Zixing Shang, Wenhui Tian, Zun Wang, Liwei Wu, Zhenyu Wu, Jun Xu, Bowen Yang, Dingbo Yuan, Qi Zhang, Songyang Zhang, Peiheng Zhou, Dongsheng Zhu
As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, the need for unified evaluation infrastructure becomes critical. However, current evaluation pipelines remain highly fragmented and tightly coupled, hindering reproducibility and causing redundant engineering.
arXiv:2602. 06841v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Over the last decade, Explainable AI has primarily focused on interpreting individual model predictions, producing post-hoc explanations that relate inputs to outputs under a fixed decision structure.
By Sindhuja Chaduvula, Jessee Ho, Kina Kim, Aravind Narayanan, Ahmed Y. Radwan, Mahshid Alinoori, Muskan Garg, Dhanesh Ramachandram, Shaina Raza