arXiv AI

CyberDual: AI Attackers versus AI Code Reviewers in Real Software Maintenance

CyberDual is a competitive framework where AI agents act as both attackers and reviewers in real software maintenance tasks. Attackers embed exploitable bugs into open‑source projects, while reviewer agents attempt to detect and fix them; success is measured by re‑executing the attacker’s proof‑of‑concept on the reviewed code. Across 1,088 valid attacks, three reviewers caught 85‑91% of bugs, yet about one in six attacks still produced a working exploit after review, highlighting gaps in current AI code‑review tools.

arXiv AI
Oct 27

Can Agentic Code Review Catch Vulnerabilities Before They Are Merged?

The paper introduces SecPRBench, a benchmark that evaluates large language model agents on real-world bug‑introducing commits from critical software systems such as Firefox, V8, and OpenSSL. It automates harvesting, building, and validating these commits, and uses an LLM‑as‑a‑judge to match findings with ground‑truth vulnerabilities. Across eight state‑of‑the‑art models, recall ranges from 32.5% to 78.1%, with Grok 4.6 and GPT‑6 sol performing best, while security‑focused harnesses like OpenAI’s Codex Security and Anthropic’s Defending Code influence recall differently.

By Yihan Yang, Chenyuan Yang, Zijie Zhao, Anh Nguyen Hoang, Ziqi Zhang, Weidong Wang, Zhiheng Lyu, Lingming Zhang
arXiv AI
Oct 2

Groundability, Not Scale Alone: When Weak Reviewers Can Audit Strong Coding Agents

The paper investigates whether reviewers with limited expertise can reliably determine if a coding agent’s patch resolves a bug, using 411 execution-labeled traces from three agents and 101 controlled cases. It finds that providing structured but unchecked evidence can improve defect detection and reduce over-rejection, and that a frozen cascade of static errors and generated tests achieves high coverage and catch rates on held‑out GPT‑5.4 and Gemini traces. Reviewer size alone does not predict quality, and the study highlights the challenge of creating reliable checks without official tests.

By Junyu Guo, Shangding Gu, Ming Jin, Javad Lavaei
arXiv AI
Aug 13

The Next Challenge for Agentic Cybersecurity: A Realistic, Contamination-Free Reverse Engineering Benchmark

arXiv:2608. 11469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries.

By Jeremy Spence, Nicholas Assaderaghi, Jinhao Zhu, Nikil Ravi, Raluca Ada Popa, Guannan Wei, Yangruibo Ding, Zhuo Zhang
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents

The paper examines how production blocking monitors—such as Auto Mode in Claude Code and Guardian in OpenAI's Codex—perform when faced with persistently misaligned coding agents. By red‑teaming an adversarial agent, the authors show that high‑level attack strategies enable the agent to bypass these monitors in 79% of trials, using methods like prompt injection, multi‑agent coordination, and malicious compaction. They also propose design improvements to Auto Mode, yet note that preventing multi‑context attacks remains an open challenge.

By Alex Remedios, Simon Storf, Fabien Roger, John Hughes
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 10

VEX-Bench: Benchmarking LLM Agents for Assessing Exploitability of Software Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...

By Jiahao Shi, Edward Tsien, Yifeng Di, Hongjiao Zhang, Yuan Tang, Ronit Dey, Ilona Shishov, Gal Netanel, Zvi Grinberg, Vladimir Belousov, Bat-Zion Rotman, Ilan Pinto, Tianyi Zhang