arXiv:2606. 04778v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to interventions during inference that redirect generation toward harmful outputs.
By Kyungmin Park, Taesup Kim
arXiv:2607. 12443v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Motivated by the power of large language models, there has been renewed interest in the Gold-Angluin model of language identification in the limit, with an eye toward variants of the model that might overcome the negative results for its original formulation.
By Moses Charikar, Jon Kleinberg, Chirag Pabbaraju
arXiv:2607. 23361v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language generation in the limit is an elegant model introduced by Kleinberg and Mullainathan [KM24] to formally study language generation by an algorithm that learns solely based on example strings.
By Debmalya Panigrahi, Fan Wei, Ian Zhang
arXiv:2601. 21237v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Kleinberg and Mullainathan recently proposed a formal framework for studying the phenomenon of language generation, called language generation in the limit.
By Aaron Li, Ian Zhang
The paper surveys attacks and defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), a technique that improves large language models by grounding outputs in external knowledge. It identifies new robustness and security risks such as corpus poisoning, backdoor attacks, privacy leakage, and fairness violations, and notes that existing surveys inadequately cover attacker objectives, threat models, and stage-specific defenses. The survey offers a unified, pipeline-aware overview, formalizing threat models across the corpus, retriever, and generator, categorizing attacks by accuracy, privacy, and fairness, and reviewing defenses for retrieval, rerank, generation, and traceback stages, while also summarizing robustness benchmarks and explainability methods.
By Minh Tran, Cuong Dang, Tuc Nguyen, Khanh-Tung Tran, Minh Huynh Nguyen, Trinh Chau, Kien Le, Do Xuan Long, Jiahao Zhang, Hoang D. Nguyen, Thanh Le, Suhang Wang
Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is largely developed in English, assuming these safeguards generalize across multilingual settings. However, this assumption remains underexplored and exposes a vulnerability in low-resource languages.
arXiv:2606. 28354v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The classic paradigm of language identification in the limit models learning as a game between an adversary, who reveals strings from an unknown target language, and a learner tasked with identifying that language.
By Irene Strauss, Alexandra Butoi, Ryan Cotterell
arXiv:2608. 01320v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language generation in the limit is a theoretical framework for studying how a generator can learn to produce new valid strings from a stream of positive examples.
By Ziyi Cai, Shuangping Li, Yiheng Shen, Kangning Wang, Peng Zhang
SynGhost is a novel task‑agnostic backdoor attack that injects invisible syntactic backdoors into pre‑training corpora of language models. It uses an entropy‑based poisoning filter, contrastive learning to select optimal targets, and an awareness module to reduce interference between backdoors, thereby preserving the model’s pre‑training performance. Experiments demonstrate that SynGhost can transfer to multiple downstream tasks and withstand several defense mechanisms such as perplexity checks, fine‑pruning, and the maxEntropy filter.
By Pengzhou Cheng, Wei Du, Zongru Wu, Fengwei Zhang, Libo Chen, Zhuosheng Zhang, Gongshen Liu
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
Safeguarding language model agents requires assessing complete execution trajectories under context-dependent safety policies. Existing policy-aware safeguards mainly rely on prompting or supervised f...
The paper investigates how conversational safety in language models degrades over extended, adversarial interactions. By testing three instruction‑tuned models with persistent adversarial users across up to 101 turns, the study finds that safe‑response rates drop sharply from 85–100% at the first turn to 15–44% by the end. This demonstrates that strong single‑turn safety does not guarantee continued safety in long conversations.
By Parisa Salmani, Peter R. Lewis