arXiv:2608.29458v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Sandbagging, in which a model deliberately underperforms on an evaluation despite retaining the underlying capability, threatens the safety evaluatio...
TRUSS is a framework that generates and verifies automated agent skills, ensuring they are both functionally effective and safe. It evaluates candidate skills against source evidence and nine safety properties, then tests them in a controlled environment to capture execution traces and identify failures. The system iteratively refines skills based on these results, achieving high precision in vulnerability detection and significantly improving task performance and security rates.
arXiv:2607. 11475v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance.
TRUSS is a framework that generates and verifies automated agent skills, ensuring they are both functionally effective and safe. It first checks functional claims against evidence and evaluates artifacts against nine safety properties, then tests admitted skills in a controlled environment to capture execution traces and identify failures. The approach achieves perfect precision and recall in vulnerability detection, significantly reduces attack success rates, and boosts task effectiveness and security rates in skill generation benchmarks.
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
Safety alignment in large language models can be fragile under fine-tuning, as even benign task adaptation may increase harmful compliance. Existing defenses mainly follow two directions: they either intervene during or after fine-tuning through retraining or weight modification, which can be costly and may hurt task performance, or they use model-agnostic safety classifiers, which may miss failures specific to a given fine-tuned checkpoint.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2607. 13070v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety claims for self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, a promise in a README.
arXiv:2604. 16870v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP).
arXiv:2609.01487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Skill-augmented agents load reusable skills as persistent runtime context, improving task performance but also giving malicious skills a durable chan...
arXiv:2608. 05810v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-evolving agents accumulate capability by distilling reusable skills from their execution trajectories, but we find this process is not monotonic: past a critical pool size, newly added skills degrade performance instead of improving it.
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.