The paper demonstrates that a single poisoned data point can successfully create a backdoor in linear models and ReLU neural networks without needing detailed knowledge of the training data. It establishes provable conditions under which this one‑poison attack works with high probability, achieving zero backdooring error while leaving the model’s normal performance largely unaffected. The attack relies only on coarse geometric bounds of the input space and training parameters.
By Thorsten Peinemann, Paula Arnold, Sebastian Berndt, Thomas Eisenbarth, Esfandiar Mohammadi
arXiv:2507. 01752v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Gradient-based optimization is the workhorse of deep learning, offering efficient and scalable training via backpropagation.
By Ismail Labiad, Mathurin Videau, Matthieu Kowalski, Marc Schoenauer, Alessandro Leite, Julia Kempe, Olivier Teytaud
arXiv:2606. 04767v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability.
By Chong Zhang, Xiang Li, Jia Wang, Qiufeng Wang, Xiaobo Jin
Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied. We study a different failure mode: naturally occurring statistical signals in vision data that can behave like backdoor-like triggers without being maliciously inserted.
arXiv:2606. 19652v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this work, we introduce a training procedure for shallow neural networks that promotes robustness against adversarial attacks.
By Chao Yin, Antoine Lesage-Landry
arXiv:2607. 05516v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
By Paul K. Mandal, Pavan Reddy, Tristan Malatynski
arXiv:2607. 05748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning.
By Qi Zhao, Christian Wressnegger
The paper investigates the impact of label‑flipping attacks on distributed machine learning, where an adversary can only flip a limited number of training labels. It formalizes the attack as a per‑round constrained optimization problem, derives a greedy label‑selection rule for logistic regression, and shows that this rule is provably optimal under mean aggregation. Experiments demonstrate that optimized label flipping can significantly degrade model accuracy, outperforming random flips, and that the attack transfers to other robust aggregators such as coordinate‑wise median and trimmed mean.
By Abdessamad El-Kabid, El-Mahdi El-Mhamdi
The community has recently developed various training-time defenses to counter neural backdoors introduced through data poisoning. In light of the observation that a model learns poisonous samples responsible for the backdoor easier than benign samples, these approaches either use a fixed threshold of the training loss for splitting or iteratively learn a reference model as an oracle for identifying benign samples.
arXiv:2608. 00732v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to deep neural networks, especially when training relies on third-party data, allowing adversaries to inject malicious behaviors through data poisoning.
By Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing, Jinwen Zhong
arXiv:2607. 05516v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model-specific adversarial attacks have been extensively studied.
By Paul K. Mandal, Pavan Reddy, Tristan Malatynski
arXiv:2608.21488v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: While machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in many domains, these models have shown profound vulnerabilities when they are ex...
By Mohammad Meymani, Roozbeh Razavi-Far