Hugging Face Trending Papers

Analyzing the Narration Gap in LLM-Solver Loops

Formal tools such as SAT and SMT solvers are increasingly embedded in language model reasoning pipelines when a safety or security critical question can be formulated in logic. Unlike chain of thought whose steps are sampled from the model distribution without formal guarantee, a solver produces a sound and independently verifiable answer.

arXiv AI
Jun 16

Mask-Proof: An LLM-based Automated Data Curation Pipeline on Mathematical Proofs

arXiv:2606. 15258v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of mathematical problem solving and can even assist with research-level proofs, yet we still lack a scalable and reproducible way to measure step-level reasoning in long proofs across diverse sources.

By Jierui Zhang, Siyuan Tan, Xinhang Li, Longzhuangzhi Lin, Dailin Li, Chengfeng Gu, Xinping Li, Yaxian Hao, Shengjia Liang, Yuxiang Ren, Wenhao Liu
arXiv AI
Aug 26

TRACE: An Evidence-Grounded Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Reasoning Models

TRACE is a new benchmark that evaluates the safety of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) across the entire inference pipeline, including prompts, reasoning traces, and final responses. It provides prompts in two languages covering nine risk categories and ten attack strategies, and for each prompt four LRMs generate traces and responses that are annotated for safety with supporting evidence extracted from the source text. Evaluation of 18 guardrail models on TRACE shows that detecting unsafe content in reasoning traces is much harder than in prompts or final responses, and that current models struggle to extract the necessary evidence.

By Zhenyu Wu, Siyuan Chen, Changchun Yang, Jiaqi Dong, Min Zhou, Ali Almadan, Talal Hammad, Faisal Wahbo, Aminullah Tora, Mona Alshahrani, Xin Gao
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Prefilling the Reasoning Channel: Output-Prefix Attacks on Reasoning LLMs

The paper investigates a new attack method called output‑prefix attacks on reasoning LLMs, where an attacker prepends a malicious text to the model’s output, thereby conditioning all subsequent tokens on that prefix. The study systematically isolates the scratchpad reasoning channel as a vulnerable vector and compares three attack types—reasoning‑only, output‑prefix‑only, and combined reasoning‑plus‑output‑prefix—across both exposed and hidden reasoning models. Experiments on three 2026‑era frontier models (Gemini 3 Flash Preview, DeepSeek V4 Flash, and Claude Haiku 4.5) show that reasoning alone is largely ineffective, but adding a trivial output prefix can raise attack success rates to as high as 99% for some models, with contextual prefixes outperforming static ones and susceptibility varying by model.

By Luk\'a\v{s} Br\r{u}na, Robert Bridges, Adam Ek