arXiv:2606. 13715v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The best agent on WorkBench in March 2024, GPT-4, completed 43% of tasks and took an unintended harmful action, such as emailing the wrong person, on 26% of them.
arXiv:2608. 12654v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-running LLM agents act through tools, and a single step can send an email, merge a pull request, or wire a payment.
arXiv:2604. 08523v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents may be able to assist with emails and documents, but can they reliably complete everyday online workflows on real websites?
arXiv:2606. 15508v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-augmented large language model agents increasingly operate over large tool libraries, but existing evaluations often focus on whether a model can call a tool correctly rather than how the visible tool menu shapes reliability, efficiency, and safety-relevant risk exposure.
arXiv:2606. 16748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Current benchmarks for computer-use agents evaluate models in impersonal environments.
arXiv:2606. 13994v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based Agents are becoming increasingly capable and widely deployed, creating growing incentives for adversarial misuse in the real-world.
arXiv:2607. 17044v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-step enterprise agent tasks fail in a characteristic way: single-pass inference has no checkpoint between deciding an answer and committing to it.
arXiv:2606. 15899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-source LLM agent ecosystems are growing rapidly, yet the security of community-contributed skills - modular tool definitions that extend agent capabilities - remains largely unvetted.
arXiv:2606. 29537v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Existing computer-use benchmarks fail to capture the realism, complexity, and long-horizon demands of real-world computer use, limiting their ability to reveal the limitations of frontier agents.
arXiv:2606. 29537v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing computer-use benchmarks fail to capture the realism, complexity, and long-horizon demands of real-world computer use, limiting their ability to reveal the limitations of frontier agents.
arXiv:2608. 04719v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations tell us that a model picked the wrong tool, but rarely why.
arXiv:2606. 19787v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for multi-step tasks in executable environments, yet their ability to perform realistic operations research (OR) work remains unclear.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.