arXiv:2606. 29171v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While existing data attribution methods can identify which training examples build specific mechanistic circuits, they cannot explain how training data shapes the high-level behavioral decisions a model learns to make.
arXiv:2601. 21996v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While Mechanistic Interpretability has identified interpretable circuits in LLMs, their causal origins in training data remain elusive.
arXiv:2606. 12360v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Language-model post-training is the main stage at which model behavior is shaped, yet it still largely involves optimization of scalar rewards that summarize diverse desiderata.
arXiv:2605. 03217v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased.
arXiv:2608. 03201v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety guards are widely used to filter harmful content and are typically trained via supervised fine-tuning on labeled prompt-response pairs.
arXiv:2608. 10537v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have helped uncover mechanistic explanations for LLM behaviours such as reasoning, jailbreaking etc.
Language-model post-training is the main stage at which model behavior is shaped, yet it still largely involves optimization of scalar rewards that summarize diverse desiderata. This abstraction gives practitioners little visibility into what their data actually teaches models, allowing spurious correlations to be learned by a model and inducing undesirable behaviors such as over-stylization and sycophancy.
arXiv:2606. 03885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Feature attribution methods explain predictions by assigning importance scores to input features.
arXiv:2607. 01033v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model organisms (MOs) - language models trained to exhibit undesired or unnatural behaviours - are frequently used as testbeds for evaluating white-box interpretability techniques.
arXiv:2604. 23130v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent failure mode in safety-aligned LLMs: models can be pushed into harmful behavior, but the internal representations enabling this shift remain poorly localized.
arXiv:2607. 13162v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: What a language model will and will not do is largely set during post-training, but which behaviors it expresses, hides, or resists is not revealed by prompting alone.
arXiv:2606. 32008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Mechanistic interpretability (MI) requires full access to model internals, yet the APIs for most widely deployed language models at best expose log-probabilities over output tokens.
arXiv:2604. 26866v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) acquire most of their factual knowledge during the pre-training stage, through next token prediction.