arXiv AI

Superficial Beliefs in LLM Decision-Making

arXiv:2606. 11016v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask whether large language models (LLMs) merely imitate rationales when choosing between two options, or whether their choices reflect a systematic underlying decision structure.

arXiv AI
Sep 10

Beliefs and Behavior in Language Models

arXiv:2609.07943v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In...

By Alex Smolin, Bryan Wilder
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 25

STONIC: A Layered Measurement Contract for LLM Value Profiling

arXiv:2608.23411v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM value studies often merge questionnaire ratings, pairwise choices, and values inferred from generated text into one profile. That merge assumes tha...

By Andrei Chetvergov, Stepan Ukolov, Timofei Sivoraksha, Alexander Evseev, Danil Sazanakov, Mikhail Solovev, Sergey Bolovtsov
arXiv AI
Sep 2

LLM-Driven Autonomous Vehicles Inherit Human Driver Biases in Pedestrian Yielding: Results and Implications From A New Benchmark

The paper investigates how large language and visual‑language models used in autonomous vehicles inherit human driver biases when deciding whether to yield to pedestrians. It introduces two new bias‑testing methods—All Else Being Equal and Self‑Consistency tests—to evaluate these models. Results reveal that the models’ yielding decisions are influenced by pedestrian attributes such as gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, age, skin tone, and socio‑economic status, with varying patterns across models.

By Irem Yoldas, Martim Brand\~ao, Jie Zhang, Odinaldo Rodrigues
arXiv AI
Sep 10

When Agents Say One Thing and Do Another: Validating Elicited Beliefs from LLMs

The paper introduces a decision‑theoretic framework that elicits both probability judgments and decisions from large language models (LLMs) to test whether their reported beliefs are consistent with their actions. It shows that this framework yields empirically testable conditions without assuming a specific utility function. In clinical diagnosis simulations, the authors find that while LLMs’ reported beliefs are not perfect reflections of the information in their decisions, the discrepancies are small for the strongest models.

By Khurram Yamin, Jingjing Tang, Santiago Cortes-Gomez, Amit Sharma, Eric Horvitz, Bryan Wilder
arXiv AI
Sep 21

Why Do LLMs Struggle in Strategic Play? Broken Links Between Observations, Beliefs, and Actions

The paper investigates why large language models (LLMs) struggle in strategic decision-making under incomplete information. It identifies two key gaps: an observation‑belief gap where LLMs’ internal representations of game states are accurate but brittle, and a belief‑action gap where converting these internal beliefs into actions is weak, leading to suboptimal payoffs. Experiments with Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt‑oss confirm that acting optimally on decoded beliefs would improve outcomes in most games, highlighting a bottleneck in belief‑to‑action conversion.

By Jan Sobotka, Mustafa O. Karabag, Ufuk Topcu