The paper investigates whether large language model (LLM) agents that yield to a unanimous majority in multi‑agent debate truly change their underlying premise or merely adjust their statement. Using two‑hop factual questions with an unstated intermediate entity, the authors show that agents that concede still encode the original bridge in their internal representations, as revealed by a Jacobian‑lens analysis, even when the majority answer is wrong. Experiments across several open‑weight models demonstrate that hiding or removing the agent’s earlier answer increases conformity and that the original premise can be recovered from the question alone.
arXiv:2609.08016v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent debate, in which several LLMs exchange arguments before answering, is widely assumed to improve answer quality by surfacing genuine disagre...
arXiv:2609.38324v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems of LLMs add discussion to majority voting and are therefore expected to be more capable. However, empirical reports conflict on w...
arXiv:2608. 11247v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in language models have enabled collaborative settings in which multiple models leverage one another's capabilities, iteratively improving, transforming, and extending each other's outputs.
Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise. In LLM collectives this proxy can break: agents can produce diverse-looking arguments while preserving the same conclusion.
arXiv:2608. 03722v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise.
arXiv:2607. 05545v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM conformity is often used to describe cases where a model changes a correct answer toward a peer or group response.
Grounded Continuation introduces a runtime verifier that classifies each utterance in an LLM conversation into one of eight epistemic operations and uses a symbolic engine to maintain a dependency map of claims and their supports. The verifier checks whether a new continuation is grounded by walking this map, a linear-time process that requires no additional LLM calls. On benchmarks such as ReviseQA and MemoryAgentBench, the verifier improves single-hop accuracy for several QA models, even enabling a 7B model to outperform GPT‑4o when guided by the verifier.
arXiv:2608. 03722v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise.
arXiv:2608.25937v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent systems (MAS) sometimes already have the potential to answer correctly, but still report a wrong answer. Explaining this outcome is dif...
arXiv:2606. 22737v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence?
The paper introduces TalkMesh, a decentralized network of small language model agents that learn to communicate effectively during inference. Each agent proposes an answer, scores it with a confidence head, and the most confident agent broadcasts a hint; lower‑confidence agents revise their proposals if a new suggestion scores higher. This gossip‑based consensus, trained via group relative policy optimization, enables a mesh of three agents to match the accuracy of majority voting over 32 samples, and scales to larger meshes to significantly boost performance on benchmarks like GSM8K and MATH-500.
The study investigates how limited reading capacity and claim wording influence consensus outcomes in language‑model networks. By modeling message capacity as the number of messages an agent reads, the authors show that when agents read fewer than about 6.4 messages on average, a wrong consensus becomes unreachable. However, the wording of a claim—its inherent threshold—can override this effect, leading to incorrect consensus even when most agents start correct.