arXiv Machine Learning

Bypassing Prompt Guards in Production with Controlled-Release Prompting

arXiv:2510. 01529v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ball et al.

arXiv Computation and Language
6d ago

From ASR to ASP: Evaluating Prompt Attack Vulnerabilities Against Open-Source LLMs

The paper investigates prompt injection attacks on 14 open‑source and 3 closed‑source large language models (LLMs), introducing a new metric called Attack Success Probability (ASP) that accounts for uncertainty in model responses. It demonstrates that a simple hypnotism attack can trigger objectionable behavior in models such as StableLM2, Mistral, Openchat, and Vicuna, achieving roughly 90% ASP. The study highlights that moderately well‑known LLMs are particularly vulnerable, underscoring the importance of public awareness and effective mitigation strategies.

By Jiawen Wang, Pritha Gupta, Eyke H\"ullermeier, Xiaoxue Gao, Nancy F. Chen
arXiv AI
Sep 11

Arbitrary Cipher Attacks Against Large Language Models Do Not Require Fine-Tuning

The paper reports that large language models can acquire cipher-based covert communication skills without fine‑tuning, using prompting or in‑context learning instead. This enables new jailbreak attacks that bypass alignment safeguards by encrypting harmful requests, making them appear as nonsensical text to harmfulness classifiers. The authors demonstrate successful attacks against frontier models from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI.

By Thomas Rivasseau
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 31

Not to Break, but to Attest: Adversarial Probes for Privacy-Preserving LLM Verification

The paper introduces a privacy‑preserving zk‑SNARK audit framework that uses adversarial‑style probes to detect logit drift between an approved large language model and a modified deployment. It offers three probe families—token‑based (black‑box), embedding‑based (gray‑box), and stress probes (partial white‑box)—allowing users to balance sensitivity, access, and cost. Experiments across LLM architectures and GPU platforms show token‑based probes achieve the highest mean sensitivity while remaining practical in a black‑box setting, with Groth16 proving times scaling modestly from 1.02 to 1.78 seconds and constant proof size.

By Cameron Wilding, Mina Shaker, Fatemeh Ganji
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 27

Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

The paper surveys attacks and defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), a technique that improves large language models by grounding outputs in external knowledge. It identifies new robustness and security risks such as corpus poisoning, backdoor attacks, privacy leakage, and fairness violations, and notes that existing surveys inadequately cover attacker objectives, threat models, and stage-specific defenses. The survey offers a unified, pipeline-aware overview, formalizing threat models across the corpus, retriever, and generator, categorizing attacks by accuracy, privacy, and fairness, and reviewing defenses for retrieval, rerank, generation, and traceback stages, while also summarizing robustness benchmarks and explainability methods.

By Minh Tran, Cuong Dang, Tuc Nguyen, Khanh-Tung Tran, Minh Huynh Nguyen, Trinh Chau, Kien Le, Do Xuan Long, Jiahao Zhang, Hoang D. Nguyen, Thanh Le, Suhang Wang
arXiv AI
2d ago

UniGuardian: A Unified Defense for Detecting Prompt Injection, Backdoor Attacks and Adversarial Attacks in Large Language Models

UniGuardian is a training‑free detector for large language models that jointly identifies prompt injection, backdoor, and adversarial attacks—collectively called Prompt Trigger Attacks (PTA). It measures how structured prompt perturbations shift the model’s output distribution and uses a single‑forward strategy to detect attacks while generating text in a shared batched forward pass. Experiments show that UniGuardian accurately and efficiently identifies trigger‑activated prompts in LLMs.

By Huawei Lin, Yingjie Lao, Tony Geng, Tan Yu, Weijie Zhao
arXiv AI
Sep 18

MAS-Shield: A Defense Framework for Secure and Efficient LLM MAS

MAS-Shield is a defense framework for Large Language Model–based Multi-Agent Systems that uses a coarse‑to‑fine filtering pipeline. It first selects critical agents, then applies lightweight auditing to most cases, and finally escalates only suspicious signals to a heavyweight committee. Experiments show a 92.5% recovery rate against adversarial attacks and a latency reduction of over 70% compared to existing methods.

By Kaixiang Wang, Zhaojiacheng Zhou, Bunyod Suvonov, Jiong Lou, Zihan Wang, Yuxiang Zheng, Yidan Lin, Wutong Zhang, Xianghan Kong, Chentao Wu, Jie Li