arXiv:2605. 27689v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: When machine learning systems under-perform for particular subgroups, affected users typically have no way to correct these disparities without relying on platform-level fixes.
arXiv:2608. 06469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Collaborative machine learning among financial institutions must be both group-fair and robust against deliberate adversarial manipulation.
arXiv:2603. 04689v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fair top-$k$ selection, which ensures appropriate proportional representation of members from minority or historically disadvantaged groups among the top-$k$ selected candidates, has drawn significant attention.
arXiv:2606. 20461v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Machine learning models have been shown to exhibit discriminatory outcomes or degraded performance for individuals at the intersection of multiple sensitive attributes, such as race and gender.
arXiv:2603. 17673v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents are becoming increasingly important in the security domain, but leading systems are often closed-source, cloud-based, hard to reproduce or use with sensitive code.
arXiv:2606. 12703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions.
arXiv:2605. 08876v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that execute tool-augmented, multi-step tasks, where latency is a critical factor for real-world applications.
arXiv:2605. 01961v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Learning from human preference data is becoming a useful tool, from fine-tuning large language models to training reinforcement learning agents.
arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
arXiv:2606. 10091v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine learning (ML) models are susceptible to various security, privacy, and fairness risks.
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.