arXiv:2608. 01193v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An AI development race creates a multi-agent safety dilemma.
arXiv:2511. 04500v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences.
arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.
arXiv:2606. 15385v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reward hacking, where AI systems exploit misspecified objectives to achieve high reward without satisfying intended goals, remains a central challenge in AI safety.
Technological races create tension between speed and safety: actors may gain by moving faster than competitors, even when risky development is harmful. This is prominent in debates about artificial intelligence (AI), where competitive pressure is often argued to incentivise riskier, less safety-conscious development.
arXiv:2608. 07490v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents are increasingly evaluated through games, but most benchmarks emphasize final outcomes rather than how players learn from repeated interaction.
arXiv:2607. 26034v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Technological races create tension between speed and safety: actors may gain by moving faster than competitors, even when risky development is harmful.
arXiv:2608. 09885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control.
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
arXiv:2607. 07695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce institutional red-teaming, an evaluation methodology for testing deployment rules in multi-agent AI: hold the agents, objectives, and task state fixed, vary only one rule, and attribute the resulting change in collective behavior to that rule.
arXiv:2608. 14825v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier LLM agents increasingly transact on behalf of separate principals, often using natural language rather than structured APIs.
arXiv:2605. 28114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language-model agents are moving from single-user assistants into persistent networks that build trust and reputation with one another, and the same models increasingly control physically embodied robots as well as software.
arXiv:2506. 07468v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Conventional large language model (LLM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint loop: attackers exploit a static model, then defenders patch exposed vulnerabilities.