arXiv Computation and Language

Under the Influence: Evaluating and Improving LLM Vigilance in Agentic Tasks

Hugging Face Trending Papers
Oct 5

TrustMI: Causally controlling how assistants trust their users

The paper introduces TrustMI, a method to causally control how large language model assistants decide to trust their users. By creating 2,000 contrastive conversations that vary in ability, benevolence, and integrity, the authors learn steering matrices that adjust trust decisions along linear directions in model activations while keeping the model parameters frozen. Experiments across six instruction‑tuned models show that these steering changes reliably alter trust decisions and affect safety‑related behaviors such as compliance with harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats.

arXiv AI
Sep 11

AgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents

AgentAudit is an open, extensible framework that evaluates the full lifecycle of AI agents, assessing planning, tool selection, execution, memory, and reasoning across ten dimensions such as instruction integrity, security, and alignment. Unlike existing benchmarks that focus on single aspects, AgentAudit analyzes the entire execution trace to attribute failures to specific stages. The framework was tested on five large language models, revealing significant differences in trustworthiness even among models with similar task‑completion performance.

By Shrey Nag, Sachita, Abhishek Kumar Singh, Lipi Goel, Rajeshwar Singh Janwar
arXiv AI
4d ago

SentryBench: A Cost-Sensitive Benchmark for Adversarial Robustness of Tool-Using LLM Agents in Public-Safety Deployments

SentryBench is a cost‑sensitive benchmark designed to evaluate large language model agents that use tools in public‑safety contexts. It measures agents on a frontier that jointly considers attack success, over‑refusal (missing real emergencies), and over‑reaction (unwarranted actions) under adversarial tool use, using scenarios grounded in real emergency‑call transcripts and disaster messages. The study shows that naive caution leads to high harm, while a targeted trust‑gate wrapper reduces harm across models and defenses.

By Md Abu Yusuf, Oyshi Tabassum Aditi, Md Faysal Hosain Mazed