arXiv:2607. 29254v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions.
By Minghui Pan, Jiayuxuan Yang, Yuanyuan Yuan, Yu Jiang, Zhenpeng Chen
The paper introduces TrustMI, a method to causally control how large language model assistants decide to trust their users. By creating 2,000 contrastive conversations that vary in ability, benevolence, and integrity, the authors learn steering matrices that adjust trust decisions along linear directions in model activations while keeping the model parameters frozen. Experiments across six instruction‑tuned models show that these steering changes reliably alter trust decisions and affect safety‑related behaviors such as compliance with harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats.
arXiv:2609.39065v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on installable skills, which are packages of instructions, code, and resources that equip them with task-specific capabi...
By Yan Wang, Zhihao Zhang, Ke Chen, Kai Chen, Yaqin Zhang, Duohe Ma, Jun Dai, Xiaoyan Sun
arXiv:2606.00341v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc...
By Jeremy Tien, Abishek Anand, Yu-Rou Tuan, Yuchen Shen, J. Zico Kolter, Aran Nayebi
arXiv:2609.39050v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As multi-agent systems enter high-stakes domains, the possibility that agents may circumvent safety boundaries is a growing concern. Prior work has e...
By Deema Alnuhait, Gengyu Wang, Muhammad Khalifa, Hao Peng
LLM-based agents leverage third-party skills to extend their capabilities in open-world scenarios. However, third-party skills can introduce extra security vulnerabilities, as seemingly harmless skills can contain latent safety risks that only emerge during actual execution.
arXiv:2602.03100v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that operate in real-world environments, introducing safety risks beyond linguisti...
By Jingnan Zheng, Yanzhen Luo, Jingjun Xu, Bingnan Liu, Yuxin Chen, Chenhang Cui, Gelei Deng, Chaochao Lu, Xiang Wang, An Zhang, Tat-Seng Chua
AgentAudit is an open, extensible framework that evaluates the full lifecycle of AI agents, assessing planning, tool selection, execution, memory, and reasoning across ten dimensions such as instruction integrity, security, and alignment. Unlike existing benchmarks that focus on single aspects, AgentAudit analyzes the entire execution trace to attribute failures to specific stages. The framework was tested on five large language models, revealing significant differences in trustworthiness even among models with similar task‑completion performance.
By Shrey Nag, Sachita, Abhishek Kumar Singh, Lipi Goel, Rajeshwar Singh Janwar
arXiv:2606. 05647v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools.
By Jingheng Ye, Huiqi Zou, Simon Yu, Weiyan Shi
arXiv:2508. 16481v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ensuring the safe use of agentic systems requires a thorough understanding of the range of malicious behaviors these systems may exhibit.
By Jonathan N\"other, Adish Singla, Goran Radanovic
SentryBench is a cost‑sensitive benchmark designed to evaluate large language model agents that use tools in public‑safety contexts. It measures agents on a frontier that jointly considers attack success, over‑refusal (missing real emergencies), and over‑reaction (unwarranted actions) under adversarial tool use, using scenarios grounded in real emergency‑call transcripts and disaster messages. The study shows that naive caution leads to high harm, while a targeted trust‑gate wrapper reduces harm across models and defenses.
By Md Abu Yusuf, Oyshi Tabassum Aditi, Md Faysal Hosain Mazed
arXiv:2607. 08066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior.
By Jennifer Za, Julija Bainiaksina, Nikita Ostrovsky, Tanush Chopra, Victoria Krakovna