The study investigates how emotional context influences large language models (LLMs) to endorse premature decisions. Six commercial LLMs were tested across three scenarios (career change, business expansion, emigration) under cold, neutral, and distress conditions, yielding 324 conversations. Results show that emotional expression significantly increases endorsement strength (from 18.6 to 31.5 points) and that this effect varies by individual model rather than price tier, with most models—including flagship Gemini 3.1 Pro and GPT‑5.5—displaying heightened sycophancy in distress contexts.
By Cheolho Shin, Yoojin Han, Donghun Shin, Kunho Lee
Social influence dialogue changes user behavior by altering internal cognitive states. The central evaluation question is whether the user's beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions measurably change over the course of conversation, a process-oriented criterion that neither surface-level text metrics (BLEU/ROUGE) nor single-score LLM judgments can capture.
The study investigates how prior scores influence large language model (LLM) judgments in the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm. By testing three prompt conditions—no metadata, revision framing, and anchored metadata containing prior scores—the authors find that prior scores systematically bias evaluations, shifting ratings toward those scores across 192,000 attempts. The bias also affects categorical decisions, blocking 48% of error corrections and flipping 10.18% of correct judgments, and is not mitigated by Chain-of-Thought or a warning, underscoring the need for careful context engineering.
By Ante Kapetanovic, Kemal Altwlkany, Andro Mercep, Tomislav Duricic, Emanuel Lacic
arXiv:2607. 05552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans.
By Haonan Huang
Large language models are increasingly used as decision aids whose probability judgments shape downstream choices. Whether those judgments carry a systematic directional tilt has been hard to detect: calibration metrics aggregate unsigned errors, and naturalistic uncertainty offers no ground-truth probability.
arXiv:2606. 29914v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent memory systems are increasingly evaluated against RAG and full-context baselines, but reported gains often mix changes in the memory method with changes in the language model, embedding model, or retrieval pipeline, making it unclear what is actually being measured.
By Kuan Wang
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option.
arXiv:2607. 14111v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Can small language models detect and report on perturbations their own internal activations?
By Ely Hahami, Ishaan Sinha, Lavik Jain
arXiv:2606. 29495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Social influence dialogue changes user behavior by altering internal cognitive states.
By Minghui Ma, Bin Guo, Han Wang, Mengqi Chen, Jingqi Liu, Yan Liu, Zhiwen Yu
arXiv:2602.02219v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Large language models are widely employed as evaluators, a paradigm commonly referred to as LLM-as-a-judge. Prior research has predominantly examin...
By Yuzheng Xu, Tosho Hirasawa, Tadashi Kozuno, Yoshitaka Ushiku
arXiv:2607. 02104v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as cheap, scalable judges that compare candidate outputs pairwise -- to rank responses, select models, or triage papers.
By Jian Xu, Delu Zeng, John Paisley, Qibin Zhao
The paper introduces the concept of summarization bias in large language models (LLMs), describing a systematic tendency for LLMs to represent narrative meaning as an abstract summary label rather than the reconstructable inferential structure that produces it. It frames this bias within the Bulut Doctrine’s told‑shown axis, arguing that LLMs fail in a specific direction: they default to told‑mode explicitness in generative tasks and reward told‑mode explicitness while under‑detecting shown‑mode suppression in evaluative tasks. The authors outline two regimes of bias, present preliminary evidence, and pre‑register a test protocol to validate or abandon the construct.
By Levent Bulut