arXiv AI

Pay for The Second-Best Service: A Game-Theoretic Approach Against Dishonest LLM Providers

arXiv:2511. 00847v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) induces a critical vulnerability: the potential for dishonest manipulation by service providers.

arXiv AI
Sep 24

Learning the Cost of Reliable Inference

arXiv:2609.28322v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Benchmarking and routing platforms increasingly act as intermediaries connecting large language model providers with end-users. However, providers on t...

By Dimitrios Rontogiannis, Ander Artola Velasco, Manuel Gomez Rodriguez
arXiv AI
Aug 26

Ad Insertion in LLM-Generated Responses

arXiv:2601.19435v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Sustainable monetization of large language models (LLMs) remains a critical open challenge. Traditional search advertising, which relies on s...

By Shengwei Xu, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang, Grant Schoenebeck
arXiv AI
Sep 24

CAVEAT: Towards Robust Computer-Use Agents in Incentive-Misaligned Environments

CAVEAT is a new benchmark that tests computer‑use agents (CUAs) in nine online marketplace environments where platform incentives may steer agents away from user goals. The study finds that agents succeed in choosing user‑optimal products only 78.6% of the time in neutral settings, dropping to 17.3% when steering mechanisms are active. By diagnosing three failure points—priority distortion, premature narrowing of options, and early commitment—CAVEAT-Harness interventions raise user‑optimal purchasing success by 55.0%.

By Yuxuan Li, Will Epperson, Wesley Deng, Zezhou Huang