Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
By Long P. Hoang, Hai V. Le, Shaoyang Xu, Wei Lu, Wenxuan Zhang
arXiv:2605. 00123v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts.
By Shubham Kumar, Narendra Ahuja
arXiv:2606. 31748v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training on language models often induces over-refusal: improved safety on harmful prompts at the cost of increased refusal on harmless ones.
By Taeyoun Kim, Aviral Kumar
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
By Andy Wang, Parv Mahajan, David Demitri Africa, Alexandra Souly, Jordan Taylor, Robert Kirk
arXiv:2608. 03201v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety guards are widely used to filter harmful content and are typically trained via supervised fine-tuning on labeled prompt-response pairs.
By Yu Feng, Chunting Zang, Chen Shen, Rui Miao, Ge Teng, Weidong Cai, Jieping Ye
arXiv:2608. 08199v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in group decision-making with other LLMs and humans.
By Wenwen He, Wenke Huang, Wei Yang Bryan Lim, Dacheng Tao
arXiv:2606. 07874v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs-as-judges are the only way to evaluate safety at scale.
By Anissa Alloula, Federico Licini, Ava Batchkala, Seraphina Goldfarb-Tarrant
Safety interventions on dual-use knowledge typically choose between destroying hazardous content (e. g.
arXiv:2606. 32038v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When does training language models (LMs) to generate explanations of their predictions yield faithful introspection, rather than superficial imitation?
By Zifan Carl Guo, Laura Ruis, Jacob Andreas, Belinda Z. Li
arXiv:2505. 18672v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Representation intervention aims to localize and modify the representations that encode the underlying concepts in large language models (LLMs) to elicit the aligned and expected behaviors.
By Hongzheng Yang, Yongqiang Chen, Zeyu Qin, Tongliang Liu, Chaowei Xiao, Kun Zhang, Bo Han
arXiv:2605. 05427v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.
By Alif Al Hasan, Sumon Biswas