Imbalanced Semi-Supervised Learning via Label Refinement and Threshold Adjustment
arXiv:2407. 05370v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Semi-supervised learning (SSL) algorithms often struggle to perform well when trained on imbalanced data.
arXiv:2607. 00113v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Background.
arXiv:2407. 05370v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Semi-supervised learning (SSL) algorithms often struggle to perform well when trained on imbalanced data.
The paper introduces C-Score, a diagnostic framework for evaluating pseudo‑label‑based semi‑supervised learning (SSL) when unlabeled data may contain out‑of‑distribution (OOD) samples. C-Score assesses training behavior across prediction, feature representation, and optimization, using metrics such as PLE, CCI, Sem‑Drift, and Grad‑Align. Experiments on CIFAR‑10 and CIFAR‑100 with various OOD sources show that C‑Score detects hidden degradation that clean accuracy alone fails to reveal, highlighting the need for internal diagnostic signals in SSL robustness assessment.
The study evaluates pseudo‑labeling for semi‑supervised learning on Android malware attribution using six classifiers. Results show that the benefit of SSL varies strongly by classifier: SVM gains the most, LightGBM improves modestly, and Random Forest can be harmed at low label ratios. The approach particularly helps hard‑to‑classify families and achieves near‑optimal performance with about 800 labeled samples.
arXiv:2608.24381v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-supervised learning (SSL) has emerged as a promising approach for tabular data, yet its efficacy under extreme label scarcity and test-time missin...
arXiv:2607. 16363v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A large body of Semi-supervised Learning~(SSL) algorithms encounter the threshold $\tau$ to select pseudo-labels.
arXiv:2512. 10244v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Semi-supervised few-shot learning (SSFSL) resembles real-world applications such as auto-annotation, as it aims to learn a model from a few labeled and abundant unlabeled task-specific examples to annotate the unlabeled ones.
arXiv:2608. 15761v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Edge-IIoTset is the reference benchmark for machine-learning intrusion detection in the industrial Internet of Things, and results reported on it cluster above 99%.
The paper presents Baszta, a Polish multi‑label content‑safety classifier trained by fine‑tuning the 124M‑parameter allegro/herbert‑base‑cased model on five categories (hate, vulgarity, sexual content, crime, self‑harm) using a Focal + R‑Drop objective. In out‑of‑distribution evaluation on the Gadzi Język benchmark, Baszta achieves a small but statistically significant improvement in micro‑F1 over the Bielik Guard system, though the macro‑F1 advantage disappears when both models are properly tuned. The study also explores calibration techniques, showing that per‑category temperature scaling can recover performance lost by Platt scaling or isotonic regression, and discusses the trade‑offs between robust calibration and adversarial recall.
arXiv:2609.14451v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern semi-supervised learning (SSL) couples pseudo-label generation and classifier training, using the classifier's own confidence to select the ps...
arXiv:2605. 16446v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Semi-supervised learning (SSL) enables prediction with limited labels, but high-stakes tabular applications (medical, credit, recidivism) require statistical fairness guarantees.
The paper evaluates the common assumption that combining flow statistics and TLS handshake fingerprints improves encrypted command-and-control detection. Using 17,577 TLS flows from 62 real Cobalt Strike captures, the authors show that data leakage and preprocessing choices inflate performance metrics, revealing that the true benefit of multi-view fusion is minimal (0.022 F1). They also uncover that many captures contain only benign traffic and that class imbalance is an artifact of analysis rather than a real feature of the task.
arXiv:2602. 14161v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Detecting prompt injection, jailbreak attacks, and harmful requests is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely, yet current evaluation practices in this literature overestimate generalization.