arXiv AI

AtomEval: Validity-Aware Atomic Evaluation of Adversarial Claim Rewriting in Fact Verification

arXiv:2604. 07967v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can rewrite refuted claims to evade evidence-based fact verifiers, but conventional attack success rate (ASR) can be inflated when rewrites change, weaken, or correct the false proposition they are supposed to preserve.

arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 16

Benchmarking Factual Robustness of LLMs via Multi-conversation Persuasion

The paper introduces the SAST-IR framework to evaluate large language models’ robustness against persuasion attacks in a memory‑less setting, revealing a flaw called "Refusal Inertia" that masks true vulnerability. Using the CP‑Agent and a custom CounterFact‑Strict dataset, the authors demonstrate that simple, diverse attack strategies achieve a 96% success rate, while complex attacks often trigger defensive compliance. The study highlights severe brittleness in current state‑of‑the‑art models when deprived of conversation history.

By Zhuoang Cai
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.

By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Trustworthy RAG: An Evaluation Agent for Detecting Misinformation and Knowledge Poisoning in Generative AI Systems

The paper introduces Trustworthy RAG, an evaluation agent designed to detect misinformation and knowledge poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems. It combines natural language inference verification, a five-signal poison detector, and a weighted Trust Index to assess the reliability of retrieved content. Experiments on multiple LLMs show high accuracy and precision, with the agent effectively blocking unsafe advice in a secure-coding assistant scenario.

By Balkrishna Giri, Md Toufique Hasan, Jussi Rasku, Muhammad Waseem, Pekka Abrahamsson
arXiv AI
6d ago

JevAdvBench: A Benchmark and Black-Box Attacks for Reinforcement Learning for Calibrated Decisions Models

JevAdvBench introduces the first adversarial benchmark for reinforcement‑learning‑based calibrated decision (RLCD) models, providing 812 typed questions across 66 scenarios and a black‑box attack suite of 9,744 single‑edit variants. The benchmark evaluates attacks by comparing each perturbed decision to the model’s own clean decision and to an identical re‑run, revealing that rewording changes decisions by only 1.2 percentage points while certain injected opinions can flip 12.1% of decisions and lower confidence below 0.8 in 38% of cases. These findings demonstrate that RLCD models can be significantly misled by seemingly innocuous input edits, underscoring the need to treat the state as untrusted in applications.

By Jianyi Hu, Hangtao Zhang, Yi Liu, Yeqi Zeng, Li Zeng, Xianlong Wang, Rui Wang, Leo Yu Zhang
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 27

From Passive Response to Proactive Correction: Enhancing LLM Robustness Against Input Fact Perturbations

The paper introduces DEDUCE, a three‑stage framework that turns large language models into proactive error correctors by detecting input fact errors, devising correction strategies, and delivering reliable answers. It also presents MisFactQA, a dataset of factual errors, and new metrics for robustness evaluation. Experiments on TruthfulQA, FalseQA, and MisFactQA show significant gains in accuracy and error correction across Qwen, LLaMA, and Gemma models.

By Ping Wang, Xiangguo Sun, Bingbing Xu, Guocong Li, Xiaofeng Meng