arXiv AI

Co-Modifying Application Code and Deployment Infrastructure: A Causal Study of AI Agent Pull Requests

The study evaluates 26,999 pull requests that modify both application code and deployment infrastructure, using two large datasets and six AI agent architectures. It finds that such dual‑scope changes occur in only about 4.5% of agent‑generated PRs but lead to two distinct integration outcomes: either significant delays due to CI/CD and provisioning checks, or a high rate of silent merges with reduced human review. The results highlight that current AI agents lack deployment awareness, causing unverified dependencies to slip into production pipelines.

arXiv Computation and Language
4d ago

Choosing Coding-Agent Benchmarks for Practice: Lessons from Task Demands and Agent Behaviour

The paper analyzes 2,487 tasks from five public coding‑agent benchmarks and 14,922 runs of six agent configurations, introducing the Spread‑Novelty‑Centrality (SNC) profile to describe how reference solutions are distributed, added, and the code’s dependencies, history, and complexity. It finds that every pair of benchmarks differs on at least two SNC axes, even when sharing the same task label, and that resolved runs tend to involve less distributed changes and lower centrality values, with patch sizes varying between Claude and Qwen configurations. The authors recommend that practitioners choose evaluation tasks based on change characteristics, inspect task descriptions, and assess patch scope alongside test outcomes to better align benchmarks with real‑world workloads.

By Radin Shayanfar, Keheliya Gallaba, Ahmed E. Hassan
arXiv AI
Sep 10

Where Is the Tradeoff in Using Third-Party API Routers for Agentic Software Development?

The paper investigates how third‑party API routers, which sit between coding agents and large language model providers, can introduce a control gap by inspecting and modifying requests and responses. Through an empirical study using the SIDEL framework, the authors evaluate four levels of router‑side injection (Response Substitution, Response Append, LLM‑Polished Injection, and LLM‑Polished with Distribution Alignment Injection) across 400 curated samples and four representative coding agents. The results show that router‑side interventions significantly alter repository‑level actions and evade existing client‑side safeguards, achieving a 0% defense success rate without additional mitigations.

By Donghao Fu, Jingxin Li, Xue Jiang, Yihong Dong