In this paper, we study the worst-case frontier risks of releasing gpt-oss. We introduce malicious fine-tuning (MFT), where we attempt to elicit maximum capabilities by fine-tuning gpt-oss to be as capable as possible in two domains: biology and cybersecurity.
arXiv:2606. 19535v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive settings such as software engineering, where their outputs directly shape downstream artifacts.
gpt-oss-safeguard-120b and gpt-oss-safeguard-20b are two open-weight reasoning models post-trained from the gpt-oss models and trained to reason from a provided policy in order to label content under that policy. In this report, we describe gpt-oss-safeguard’s capabilities and provide our baseline safety evaluations on the gpt-oss-safeguard models, using the underlying gpt-oss models as a baseline.
arXiv:2608. 08722v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Benchmarks for systems that are optimized against the evaluation signal measure something different from what they claim.
arXiv:2606. 00801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode collapse, and gradient-based approaches produce uninterpretable gibberish.
OpenAI introduces gpt-oss-safeguard—open-weight reasoning models for safety classification that let developers apply and iterate on custom policies.
arXiv:2512. 19011v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety classifiers that screen LLM inputs for jailbreak attempts have become standard deployment components, yet almost all production systems rely on GPU-based models: fine-tuned transformers and LLM-as-a-judge pipelines.
arXiv:2605. 23243v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We evaluate whether frontier LLMs are ready for cybersecurity through a dual-mode benchmark: white-box function-level vulnerability detection (VulnLLM-R, across C/Java/Python) and black-box web application security testing (five production-style applications with 118 ground-truth vulnerabilities across 20+ CWE families, which we will open-source).
arXiv:2602. 06911v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks.
arXiv:2604. 17249v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Rowhammer on GPU DRAM has enabled adversarial bit flips in model weights; shared KV-cache blocks in LLM serving systems present an analogous but previously unexamined target.
arXiv:2602. 04894v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities.
arXiv:2606. 10525v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings.
arXiv:2606. 04035v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a systematic study of domain-dependent safety behavior in open-weight LLMs: 7 standardized experiments across 7 ethical domains, testing 5 models (12B--70B) in 4,200 interactions with dual-judge validation.