arXiv:2607. 19292v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios.
By Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci
arXiv:2609.05749v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Work on the risks of artificial intelligence has focused predominantly on capability risk: the danger that systems become too powerful, too autonomous,...
By Emilio Barkett, Alexander Kimpton, Daniel Graham, Yusuf Kundgol
arXiv:2607. 03215v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Artificial intelligence has spread across the whole of the security lifecycle.
By Mohamed Chahine Ghanem
The paper proposes AI Deployment Accountability Engineering (ADAE), a new subdiscipline focused on establishing measurable, continuous, and actionable accountability for AI systems once they are deployed. ADAE treats accountability as a deployment-layer property, aiming to ensure systems remain within acceptable risk limits, identify failure contexts, attribute failures across technical and human components, and translate technical failures into downstream consequences. The authors outline a research agenda built around four pillars—structured discovery of context-dependent failure modes, privacy-preserving accountability measurement, system-level risk analysis for agentic AI, and translation of technical failures into operational and institutional risks—to support timely intervention in safety-critical socio-technical environments.
By Murat Kantarcioglu
arXiv:2608. 05173v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI capabilities advance, AI systems will pose greater risks to national security and potentially humanity as a whole.
By Peter Barnett
arXiv:2606. 17286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-enabled authoritarianism is not confined to autocracies.
By Jeba Sania, Marta Ziosi, Fazl Barez
arXiv:2607. 26069v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As AI systems are rapidly integrated into critical economic, governmental, and national security functions, the gap between AI adoption and AI security readiness continues to widen.
By Gil Gekker, Rachel Steratore, Everett Smith, Asher Brass-Gershovich, Varun Gandhi, Nicole Nichols, Vijay Bolina, Buck Shlegeris, Lisa Einstein, Dan Lahav, Omer Nevo, Sella Nevo
The paper argues that the rapid pace of AI-driven change creates an adaptation gap, making human resilience a crucial capability for the AI era. Resilience is defined as the ability to absorb disruption while maintaining effective action and agency, and is examined at psychological, social, and organizational levels. The authors link resilience research with AI-in-the-loop experiments, showing that AI assistance can boost productivity, empathy, and calibrated reliance, and propose a socio‑technical agenda for education, workplace design, governance, and evaluation.
By Shaoshan Liu, Anina Schwarzenbach, Yiyu Shi
The paper discusses the need to adapt incident reporting frameworks for AI agents, which are rapidly deployed and face unique security challenges. By comparing AI systems and agents and consulting 23 experts, the authors identify key reporting elements such as agent memory, autonomy levels, and tool usage. They also highlight open research questions, potential reporting weaknesses like data leakage, and outline privacy requirements for secure AI agent deployment.
By Anastasia Pustozerova, Eugene Bagdasarian, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Battista Biggio, Nico Ebert, David Filip, Marc Fischer, Heather Frase, David Hofer, Juliane Hoffmann, Daphne Ippolito, Somesh Jha, Sean McGregor, Esfandiar Mohammadi, Luca Nannini, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea, Kevin Paeth, Andrew Paverd, Jonathan Petit, Andreas Rauber, Christian Riess, John Sotiropoulos, Andreas Wespi, Kathrin Grosse
arXiv:2607. 25648v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources.
By Sam Relins, Daniel Birks
The study evaluates 684 U.S. federal AI governance documents for how they address 14 sectors and 24 AI risks, measuring both breadth and depth of coverage. It finds that risks related to robustness, system security, and governance are more frequently and substantively discussed than socioeconomic, environmental, and emerging risks, and that sectors such as public administration, national security, information, and scientific services receive higher coverage than finance and healthcare. By comparing these coverage patterns with expert vulnerability assessments, the authors identify potential gaps in AI governance that could inform future policy and industry decisions.
By Ho Ting Hung, Angelica Chowdhury, James Teague, Simon Mylius, Spencer Michaels, Peter Slattery, Alexander Saeri, Neil Thompson
arXiv:2609.14796v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The threat that AI persuasion poses to human control has been acknowledged in the literature, but not yet systematically studied. Now that persuasion a...
By Joshua Levy, Mick Yang, Kellin Pelrine