arXiv Machine Learning

Located but Not Releasable: Silent Gate Inversion and Bounded Linear Release

arXiv:2608. 11822v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A growing body of work reports that language models represent task-relevant latent structure that they fail to use.

arXiv AI
6d ago

FLIP: Final Layer Inference-Time Probing for Vision-Language Models

FLIP is a final‑layer inference‑time probe designed to test whether a logit‑facing intervention site in an open‑weight vision‑language model (VLM) supports structured, task‑linked computation rather than generic perturbation. The probe applies elementwise flooring to the final normalized hidden state before logit computation, leaving other model components unchanged. By sweeping intervention strength on a controlled detection/counting task, FLIP identifies three regimes—negligible change, a bounded interior regime with improved detection recall and reduced counting error, and over‑suppression—while a four‑criterion protocol ensures the observed effects are mechanistically interpretable.

By Drandreb Earl O. Juanico, Rowel O. Atienza
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Open-Weight Masked Introspection: Measuring What Language Models Can Report About Their Own Computation

The study investigates whether open‑weight language models can introspect on their own internal computations. Using the Open‑Weight Masked Introspection (OWMI) framework, researchers intervened on various internal components of eight models and asked them to report whether changes had occurred. Across 78,000 measurements, none of the models reliably distinguished real interventions from sham ones, with AUROC values essentially at chance. Why It Matters: The findings suggest that current open‑weight models lack the ability to audit their own internal states, highlighting a limitation for oversight that relies on a model’s self‑reporting.

By Emilio Ferrara
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Sep 3

Clean Engineering, Unstable Measurement: A Preregistered Reliability Failure of Black-Box LLM Observers on Shared Endpoints

The paper investigates the reliability of language‑model judges used as measurement instruments on shared endpoints. Through two preregistered audits of 52,988 requests, the authors found that repeat rankings and byte‑identical replays fell far short of required thresholds, revealing significant instability. They identify three mechanisms—label‑to‑meaning bias, candidate gaps below the noise floor, and input permutation noise—that explain the gap, and propose a snapshot‑identity ladder, design rules, and a reporting checklist to mitigate such failures.