arXiv:2607. 16228v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Most tensor-kernel correctness tests go through a fixed-shape all close-style check with hand-picked absolute and relative tolerances.
arXiv:2606. 20128v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Benchmarks for LLM-generated GPU kernels (KernelBench, TritonBench, GEAK) score correctness through fixed-shape, small-sample allclose-style checks.
arXiv:2606. 27396v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Test-input generation for tensor kernels is folkloric.
arXiv:2608. 12700v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Systems that generate GPU kernels with language models report high correctness rates.
arXiv:2606. 10229v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study whether demonstration-curation metrics that detect defective training episodes also improve the downstream behavior-cloning policy that trains on the curated data.
arXiv:2607. 16241v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate custom CUDA kernels that appear to outperform PyTorch on benchmarks such as KernelBench.
arXiv:2607. 11969v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Point-adjustment (PA), long the default scoring protocol in time-series anomaly detection (TSAD), was shown by Kim et al.
arXiv:2608. 13756v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Two GPU kernels implementing the same scaled INT8 GEMM interface are usually treated as interchangeable.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
arXiv:2606. 25487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade.
arXiv:2607. 17417v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models confabulate chemical objects (molecular formulas, space groups, formation energies) in fluent reasoning traces, concentrated on long-tail entities where confidence is least trustworthy.
Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked.
arXiv:2607. 14568v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A companion study ran a 35B mixture-of-experts model on a 2011 NVIDIA Tesla C2075 (Fermi, sm_20, 6GB) as a GPU-prefill/CPU-decode hybrid, because the 4-bit model did not fit in device memory (arXiv:2606.