arXiv AI

ECM Contracts: Contract-Aware, Versioned, and Governable Capability Interfaces for Embodied Agents

arXiv:2604. 13097v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Embodied agents increasingly rely on modular capabilities that are installed, upgraded, composed, and governed at runtime, yet the interfaces between these modules are specified only at the level of message types, so integration failures surface only during execution.

arXiv AI
1d ago

Specifying AI-SDLC Processes: A Protocol Language for Human-Agent Boundaries

arXiv:2606. 20615v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents now act as first-class members of the software development lifecycle, but the instruments teams use to direct them enforce nothing: process encoded in prompts is flexible but unenforceable, while workflow formalisms are enforceable but do not model autonomous agents.

By Ylli Prifti, Pasquale De Meo, Alessandro Provetti
arXiv AI
23h ago

PACE: Policy-Attested Contract Execution for Safe AI Agents in Decentralized Finance

arXiv:2608. 17220v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents are emerging as interfaces for decentralized finance (DeFi) actions such as swaps, lending operations, and yield management.

By Rabimba Karanjai (Larry), Yang Lu (Larry), Richard Williamson (Larry), Hemanth Hm (Larry), Prakhar Mehrotra (Larry), Lei Xu (Larry), Weidong (Larry), Shi
arXiv AI
Jul 2

ATM: CID-Brokered Pre-Write Admission for Multi-Agent Code Co-Synthesis

arXiv:2607. 00041v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems can decompose software-engineering work into planning, generation, validation, and repair, but a narrower systems problem remains: before any governed shared mutation is applied, a system must decide which concurrently formed write intents may proceed in parallel, which require deterministic composition or serialization, and which must take a fail-closed path.

By Eagl Huang
arXiv AI
Jun 2

AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations

arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.

By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney