arXiv:2606. 04152v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are reshaping research practice while quietly eroding researchers epistemic accountability.
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arXiv:2607. 25620v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quattrociocchi and colleagues warn that the fluent outputs of large language models may allow linguistic plausibility to substitute for epistemic evaluation, producing the condition they call *Epistemia*: the experience of possessing knowledge without undertaking the practices through which judgment would ordinarily be warranted.
arXiv:2601. 14295v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models increasingly function as artificial reasoners: they evaluate arguments, assign credibility, and express confidence.
arXiv:2607. 00211v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Epistemic thinking plays a central role in students' learning processes when applying generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), particularly in programming contexts where learners must construct queries, evaluate and validate AI-generated outputs, and regulate problem-solving strategies.
arXiv:2607. 02369v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs stage a new form of cultural encounter that is massive, automated, and monolingual.
The paper examines how large language model (LLM) outputs are increasingly used in contexts that demand justified interpretations, such as law, education, policy analysis, and public moral debate. It identifies a recurring failure—interpretive misplacement—where model-generated readings are treated as settled meanings without explicit interpretive frames, provenance, or defensible alternatives, leading to accountability loss. Drawing on philosophical hermeneutics, the author proposes design principles for human‑AI co‑interpretation, reorganizes existing LLM techniques into hermeneutically responsible patterns, and discusses implications for legal practice, education, scholarship, and public discourse, while framing digital hermeneutics as a literacy for critically engaging with AI‑mediated texts.
This study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably answer scientific questions and how susceptible they are to manipulation by fringe scientific material. The authors modified custom LLMs to prioritize knowledge from selected fringe papers on the Fine Structure Constant and Gravitational Waves, then compared their responses with those of domain experts and standard LLMs. The altered models produced fluent, convincing answers that contradicted scientific consensus and were difficult for non-experts to detect as misleading, demonstrating that LLMs are vulnerable to manipulation and cannot replace expert judgment.