arXiv:2607. 13346v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored.
By Aman Mehta
arXiv:2606. 17229v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone.
By Petr Nyoma
arXiv:2606. 30449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Probes on model internals could help monitor agentic systems if they identify harmful text or tool actions before those actions are generated.
By Max Fomin, Elad David, Amit LeVi
arXiv:2606. 24952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it.
By Cosimo Galeone, Anna Ettorre, Minsu Park, Giuseppe Ettorre, Daniele Ligorio
arXiv:2608. 13063v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work on LLM behavior under anomalous conditions asks whether a model notices anomalies.
By Sam Mao
arXiv:2606. 26071v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A central goal of safety research is determining whether a model is misaligned.
By Aditya Singh, Gerson Kroiz, Senthooran Rajamanoharan, Neel Nanda