arXiv:2605. 29729v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce scheming honeypot evaluations, a framework for testing whether models will pursue instrumental goals if given the opportunity.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv Machine Learning.
arXiv:2607. 24758v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are capable of recognizing evaluation contexts and altering their behavior to reflect evaluator expectations rather than typical deployment behaviors, a phenomenon known as alignment faking.
arXiv:2604. 13301v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Trusted monitoring, the standard defense in AI control, is vulnerable to adaptive attacks, collusion, and strategic attack selection.
arXiv:2607. 14285v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict?
arXiv:2604. 08169v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization.
Apollo Research and OpenAI developed evaluations for hidden misalignment (“scheming”) and found behaviors consistent with scheming in controlled tests across frontier models. The team shared concrete examples and stress tests of an early method to reduce scheming.
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.