arXiv:2606. 27287v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to screen and rank job applicants, creating incentives for candidates to strategically manipulate algorithmic hiring systems.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2608. 08027v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data.
arXiv:2606. 24381v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt-based interaction has become a dominant paradigm for using large language models (LLMs), where multiple candidate prompts are evaluated and the top-ranked one is selected for downstream use.
arXiv:2512. 08724v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Text-to-image (TTI) diffusion models have achieved remarkable visual quality, yet they have been repeatedly shown to exhibit social biases across sensitive attributes such as gender, race and age.
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
arXiv:2606. 18530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Domain-camouflaged injection attacks embed malicious instructions in retrieved content using domain-appropriate vocabulary, evading standard detectors that rely on syntactic injection markers.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.