arXiv:2606. 02834v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysis starts with the raw bytes of an executable program, and tools to "lift" these to higher-level representations, such as assembly, are expensive and subject to error.
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arXiv:2606. 20436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable.
arXiv:2509. 14335v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Automated malware classifiers achieve strong detection performance, but auditing requires more than flagging a sample: analysts must explain malicious behaviors and justify them with code evidence.
arXiv:2509. 23449v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Binary code similarity detection is a core task in reverse engineering.
arXiv:2607. 20216v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours.
The paper introduces ALIBI, a semantic cover story attack that injects a small, non-executed read‑only section into compiled binaries to mislead large language model (LLM) malware analyzers. By embedding a coherent but false security narrative, ALIBI can cause LLMs such as Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT‑5.5 Pro, and Claude Opus 4.7 to downgrade or flip the verdicts of malicious samples. The attack also transfers to ELF binaries, and even a verification‑guided defense prompt only partially mitigates the effect, leaving a significant portion of malicious samples classified as benign.
arXiv:2608. 11766v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Binary code representation learning is a fundamental problem in software security and reverse engineering.