arXiv Machine Learning By Avidan Shah, Jay Chooi, Jinghua Ou, Shi Feng

Covert Influence Between Language Models

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arXiv:2606. 04071v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As language models increasingly consume one another's outputs, covert influence -- a phenomenon where a sender's payload (the behavioral disposition it is conditioned to propagate) transfers to a receiver through carriers undetectable by humans -- becomes a growing risk.

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